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Among the possible approaches to the problem of the interna-
tional protection of human rights, the treaty approach has proven to
be the most effective. Several considerations lead to the conclusion
that multilateral treaties are perhaps the only legal means that may
give a certain degree of international protection to human rights.
These considerations include the inherent difficulty in ascertaining
any rule of customary international law, the lack of consensus con-
cerning the true nature of the "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations,"' the vagueness of the human rights provisions
of the UN Charter,2 and the uncertainty about the legal meaning and
effect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 and other Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions. Obviously, the treaty approach has sev-
eral weaknesses as well,4 but it can be an effective tool for
implementing "hard law"5 in this field. For example, this effective-
ness has been amply demonstrated by the implementation of the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms6 .
A distinctive feature of the treaty approach is the ability of any
contracting State to make reservations at the moment of ratification
of or accession to an international agreement.7  The term "reserva-
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c).
2. U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948).
4. See Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, Wis. L.
REV. 171, 205 (1969). Bilder points out four weaknesses of the treaty approach. These in-
clude: (1) conventions are legally binding only on States which accept them; (2) the provisions
of conventions often reflect agreement only at the lowest common level and the language itself
is often very "soft"; (3) the sense of obligation to international commitments may be weak; and
(4) even when governments ratify and enact domestic implementing legislation the practical
enforcement may be slight. However, it appears that Bilder's critique blends two different
approaches. One approach considers the weaknesses of the international legal system as a
whole, and is reflected by items (3) and (4) above. Another approach is to analyze the weak-
nesses of one of the available instruments within the international legal system, which is done
by items (1) and (2) above. For the purposes of this article, the second approach will be fol-
lowed; that is, the issues involved here will be analyzed from the international legal perspective
without considering the practical and political enforcement problems which are the well-known
background of every international law issue.
5. On the notion of "hard" and "soft" law see Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite
Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549 (1980).
6. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. 5 [hereinafter cited as European
Convention].
7. See generally D. ANZILOTrI, CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 334-336 (4th ed.
1955); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 605-608 (3d ed. 1979); C.
DE VISSCHER, THfORIES ET RIALIT.S EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 291-294 (4th ed. 1970); T.
ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 27-36 (1974); M. GIULIANO, 1 DIRITTO INTERNA-
Vol. 15
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tion" is construed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'
as meaning a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or ac-
ceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to
that State." 9 The ability to individually limit the scope of certain
norms would appear to be an easy way for unwilling States to avoid
compliance with the legal obligations embodied in multilateral trea-
ties on human rights."0 However, the possibility of formulating res-
ervations may well be seen as a strength rather than a weakness of
the treaty approach, insofar as it allows a more universal participa-
tion in human rights treaties." Prior to any discussion of this point,
however, it is appropriate to briefly outline the historical evolution of
the law concerning reservations to multilateral treaties, which "has
ZIONALE 379-86 (1974); K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 467-542, 592-
631, 645-51 (1967); P.-H. IMBERT, LES RtSERVES AUX TRAITtS MULTILATIRAUX (1979); A.
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 158-177 (1961); G. MORELLI, NOZIONI DI DIRITrO INTER-
NAZIONALE 315-19 (7th ed. 1967); I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 40-50 (1973); H. THIERRY, J. COMBACAU, S. SUR & C. VALLtE, DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 60-65 (3d ed. 1981); E. VrrA, LE RISERVE NEI TRATrATI (1957); 14 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-93 (1970); Anderson, Reservations to Mul-
tilateral Conventions: A Re-Examination, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 450-481 (1964); Bishop,
Reservations to Treaties, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 245-341 (1961); Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral
Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67-92 (1976-77); Fitzmaurice, Reservations to Multilateral
Conventions, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1-26 (1953); Fitzmaurice, Law and Procedure of the Inter-
national Court of Justice 1951-54: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 203, 272-93 (1957); Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic
View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372-94 (1980); Jimenez de Arechaga, International
Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 38-42 (1978); Koh, Reservations to
Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 71-116 (1982); Nisot, Les rdserves aux traitds et la Convention de Vienne du 23 Mai
1969, 77 REVUE GfNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 200-06 (1973);
Parry, The Law of Treaties, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-198 (M. Soren-
son ed. 1968); Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 95-218 (1975); Szafarz, Reserva-
tions to Multilateral Treaties, 3 POL. Y.B. INT'L L. 293-316 (1970); Teboul, Remarques sur les
reserves aux conventions de codification, 86 R.G.D.I.P. 679-717 (1982).
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27
(1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
9. Id. art. 2(1)(d). Many provisions of the Vienna Convention are regarded as a codifica-
tion of customary international law. See infra text accompanying notes 27-79.
10. At the Vienna Conference Mr. Maresca (Italy) colorfully asserted that "reservations
might be regarded as the disease of treaty-making." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/Add.1, at 37
(1969).
11. 0. SCHACHTER, M. NAWAZ & J. FRIED, TOWARD WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF U.N.
TREATIES 148 (1971). This UNITAR study shows statistically that "the treaties ... which
permit reservations, or do not prohibit reservations, have received proportionally larger accept-
ances than the treaties which either do not permit reservations to a part or whole of the treaty,
or which contain only one substantial clause, making reservations unlikely."
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manifestly undergone a great deal of change over the last thirty
years."' 2
I. THE PROBLEM OF RESERVATIONS TO MULTILATERAL
TREATIES: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY
A. Before the Second World War
Traditional doctrine required the unanimous consent of all con-
tracting States in order for a State making a reservation to become a
party to the treaty. This so-called unanimity rule was based on the
principle of the integrity of the treaty, which was deemed to be un-
susceptible of exceptions. The practice of the League of Nations
showed a definite acceptance of this doctrine as law by its Member
States. In 1927, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a Re-
port of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
International Law.13 The Report, which restated the doctrine of
unanimous consent for the admission of reservations, read in perti-
nent part:
In order that any reservation whatever may be validly made
in regard to a clause of the treaty, it is essential that this reserva-
tion should be accepted by all the contracting parties, as would
have been the case if it had been put forward in the course of the
negotiations. If not, the reservation, like the signature to which it
is attached, is null and void.
14
It should be noted that the Secretariat of the League, in its posi-
tion as depositary of treaties, went even further than the Committee
of Experts. The Secretariat of the League asked for unanimous ac-
ceptance of an accession which was subject to reservation not only by
all "contracting parties" of a treaty, but also by all "signatories." 15
Although the unanimity doctrine was very well established and
had the support of all leading international law scholars, a new prac-
tice regarding the admission of reservations to multilateral treaties
arose within the American States. In 1928, the Sixth International
Conference of American States adopted the Havana Convention on
Treaties."6 Article 6 of the Havana Convention reads as follows:
1. Ratification must be unconditional and must embrace
12. Bowett, supra note 7, at 67.
13. Report of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International
Law, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 69 (1927).
14. Id. at 800.
15. See Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 843, 910 (Supp. 1935).
16. Havana Convention on Treaties, Feb. 20, 1928, reprinted in Conventions on Public
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the entire treaty. It must be made in writing pursuant to the legis-
lation of the State.
2. In case the ratifying State makes reservations to the
treaty, it shall become effective when the other contracting party
informed of the reservations expressly accepts them, or having
failed to reject them formally, should perform action implying its
acceptance.
3. In international treaties celebrated between different
States, a reservation made by one of them in the act of ratification
affects only the application of the clause in question in the relation
to the other contracting States with the State making the
reservation. 17
The radical changes brought about by this Article, although par-
tially hidden by the conservative language of the first paragraph, are
to be found in the second and third paragraphs. The second para-
graph, which refers to bilateral treaties, introduced the concept of
tacit or implied acceptance of a reservation. Meanwhile, the third
paragraph, which refers to multilateral treaties, recognized the possi-
bility of applying the rest of the treaty to the reserving States, and
brought about the so-called rule of reciprocity of reservations.
Following the adoption of the Havana Convention, the Ameri-
can States consistently maintained this particular system of reserva-
tions. The new system was refined in subsequent treaties and in the
practice of the Pan American Union and the Organization of Ameri-
can States. 8 The Pan American doctrine heavily influenced general
international practice and launched a new trend in the law of treaties.
This trend was recognized after the war by the International Court of
Justice, and culminated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. It should also be mentioned that the 1928 Havana Conven-
tion, which ultimately brought about a major change in international
law, was based on a draft prepared by the International Commission
of American Jurists. Ironically, it may be reasonably assumed that
the members of the Commission actually overlooked the meaning of
Article 6 since the record does not show any intention by the Com-
mission to forsake the traditional unanimity rule.' 9
17. Id. art. 6.
18. For a detailed account of the birth and growth of the Pan American Doctrine, see
IMBERT, supra note 7, at 33-38; Ruda, supra note 7, at 115-33.
19. See Ruda, supra note 7, at 116.
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B. The 1951 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice
In its advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ° the Interna-
tional Court of Justice perceived that the international community
had changed and that the attitude of States concerning international
law had changed as well. With respect to multilateral treaties, the
priority had shifted from the principle of the absolute integrity of the
treaty to the principle of universal participation. The Court seemed
to pay homage to the traditional unanimity rule, stating that "the
notion of the integrity of the convention as adopted . . ., which is
directly inspired by the notion of contract, is of undisputed value as a
principle."21 However, the Court made it clear that times had
changed and that there was "a new need for flexibility in the opera-
tion of multilateral conventions." 2 The Court added that "it does
not appear, moreover, that the conception of the absolute integrity of
a convention has been transformed into a rule of international
law."2 3  Consequently, the Court substantially adopted the Pan
American doctrine, holding that:
[E]ach State . . will or will not . . . consider the reserving
State to be a party to the Convention [and] such a decision will
only affect the relationship between the State making the reserva-
tion and the objecting State . . . .Finally, it may be that a State
...will . . . object to [a reservation] but that an understanding
between that State and the reserving State will have the effect that
the Convention will enter into force between them, except for the
clauses affected by the reservation.
24
Furthermore, the Court introduced a new element which was
not a part of the Pan American practice. In an attempt to limit and
set guidelines for the future behavior of States, the Court established
a criterion to evaluate the admissibility of reservations and objec-
tions. The Court stated:
The object and purpose of the Convention thus limits both
the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them.
It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object
20. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 [hereinafter cited as 1951 Advisory Opinion on
Genocide].
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 26-27.
Vol. 15
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and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for
the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession, as
well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.
Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the
appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own
standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation.25
The majority opinion, however, was sharply criticized by two
dissenting opinions.2' The dissenting opinions emphasized the diffi-
culty of determining the actual object and purpose of a treaty. In
addition, the dissents critiqued the uncertainty provoked by the pre-
rogative of each State to decide whether a reservation is admissible
under the "compatibility rule." Nonetheless, the Court's decision
soon gained widespread acceptance among States and scholars. The
ultimate consequence of this favorable reception is clearly visible in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
C. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Present
Status of Customary International Law
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the basic doc-
ument for any modern study involving issues pertaining to the law of
treaties.27 The Convention has been a major work of "codification"
and "progressive development"28 of international law which has
lasted many years," and it has heavily influenced the legal pattern of
international relations.
Besides Article 2(l)(d),3° there are other provisions which deal
with the question of reservations. Article 19 governs when reserva-
tions may be formulated." Article 20 determines when they may be
25. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
26. One dissenting opinion was written jointly by Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read and
Hsu Mo. The other dissenting opinion was written individually by Judge Alverez. Id. at 31.
27. The Vienna Convention was adopted at the end of the Vienna Conference on the Law
of Treaties by the large majority of 79 votes in favor, 1 against and 19 abstentions. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.l, at 207 (1969). Cf Ago, Droit des traitis d la lumiire de la Convention
de Vienne, 134 R.C.A.D.I. 297-332 (1971); Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,
19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 47-69 (1970).
28. See U.N. CHARTER art. 13; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
art. 15. See generally Ago, La codification du droit international et les problmes de sa rdalisa-
tion, in RECUEIL D'ETUDES EN HOMMAGE 'A P. GUGGENHEIM [REc. GUGGENHEIM] 93-131
(1968).
29. The Draft of the Convention presented at the Vienna Conference was the culmination
of seventeen years of work by the International Law Commission and in particular by the four
eminent Special Rapporteurs succesively appointed: Brierly, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice and
Waldock.
30. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(l)(d).
31. Id. art. 19.
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accepted or objected to32 and Article 21 describes their legal ef-
fects.33 In addition, Article 22 describes when reservations may be
withdrawn34 and Article 23 outlines the procedures regarding reser-
vations, acceptances, objections and withdrawal. 35 These provisions
seem to indicate that the traditional unanimity rule is obsolete,
although it has not yet totally disappeared. In fact, the unanimous
consent of all signatories is still required for reservations to multilat-
eral treaties open to a restricted number of parties. Article 20(2)
requires:
When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating
States and the object and the purpose of a treaty that the applica-
tion of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essen-
tial condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty,
a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
36
Moreover, a remnant of the unanimity rule can also be found in Arti-
cle 20(3): "When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an interna-
tional organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation
requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that
organization."
3 7
Apart from these specific cases, the Vienna Convention, which
codifies flexible rules intended to foster a larger participation in mul-
tilateral treaties, seems to uphold and develop the principles set forth
in the 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide. The basic premise of the
norms embodied in the Vienna Convention is that sovereign States
are free to make whichever reservations they deem appropriate unless
the treaty forbids some or all of them. Only reservations which are
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty are admissible.3a
The real extent of this "compatibility rule" is quite controversial and
the issue will be dealt with below.3 9
Comparing this rule, as codified in the Vienna Convention, with
the one envisaged in the 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide, one
difference must be pointed out. Currently there is no limitation upon
the ability of a State to accept or object to reservations. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice set forth the object and purpose rule as a test
32. Id. art. 20.
33. Id. art. 21
34. Id. art. 22.
35. Id. art. 23.
36. Id. art. 20(2).
37. Id. art. 20(3). See generally Mendelson, Reservations to the Constitutions of Interna-
tional Organizations, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 137-171 (1971).
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 19.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 113-177.
Vol. 15
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to "limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of ob-
jecting to them."'  The Vienna Convention, however, adopted the
rule only with respect to the freedom of making reservations. The
implications of this difference will be discussed below as well.
It is fair to say that the interplay between reservations and the
acceptances of or objections to such reservations determines the obli-
gations of parties to multilateral treaties in spite of the compatibility
rule. In treaties where a "reservation clause" expressly authorizes a
given reservation the situation is quite clear. No acceptance of such a
reservation is needed4" and an objection would be a breach of the
treaty. The reason such an objection would constitute a breach is
because "having made its permissibility the object of an express
agreement, the parties have abandoned any right thereafter to object
to such a reservation."42 The role of acceptances and objections,
however, becomes fully relevant when a treaty has no reservation
clause. In this case, the situation is rather complex.
As an illustration, if State A accepts (or does not object to) the
reservation of State B, the treaty will then be in force between them
as modified by the reservation. If, on the other hand, State A objects
to the reservation of State B, the treaty will be either not in force
between them (if so expressly stated by A), 43 or it will be in force
without the provision to which the reservation relates. The practical
result of this system is that a modem multilateral treaty involves a
patchwork of different rights and obligations among the various con-
tracting States, depending upon reservations, objections and
acceptances.
To a lesser extent, a certain role is also played by the so-called
declarations and understandings, although they are not expressly
40. 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide, supra note 20, at 24.
41. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 20(1).
42. Bowett, supra note 7, at 84-85.
43. There is, therefore a presumption in favor of the entry into force of the treaty among
the two related parties. If the objecting State does not declare anything besides the objection,
the treaty will be deemed to be in force between that State and the reserving State notwith-
standing the objection. The draft of the International Law Commission, however, had the
opposite presumption. See Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General
Assembly, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter cited as 1966 I.L.C. Report],
[1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.COMM'N 173, 202-208, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A./1966/Add.l.
However, the strong position on this point taken by the Soviet Union during the Vienna Con-
ference determined the final version of the article. See USSR Explanatory Memorandum on the
Question of Reservations to Multilateral Treaties (with a proposed amendment concerning Arti-
cle 17 (now 20)), U.N. Doc A/CONF.39/L.3 (1969). The USSR amendment was eventually
approved by 49 votes to 21, with 30 abstentions. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/l1/Add.1, at 35
(1969).
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mentioned in the Vienna Convention." Often they look like true res-
ervations but are labeled in a different way. In such cases, since it is
the substance and not the label that determines the nature of a state-
ment, they must be regarded simply as reservations. Article 2(l)(d)
refers indirectly to declarations and understandings when it provides
that the statements having certain characteristics "however phrased
or named" will be treated as reservations.45
The term "declaration" is often used when a government wants
to give notice of its views on certain issues without modifying or lim-
iting any of its rights or obligations under the treaty. In fact, a decla-
ration would be more properly considered as a political statement.
The term "understanding" or "interpretative declaration" is gener-
ally used when a government intends to clarify or explain how cer-
tain provisions ought to be interpreted or applied, while retaining the
substantive rights or duties stipulated in the treaty. Declarations and
understandings short of reservations should not create legal rights or
obligations for the other contracting parties.46 However, in view of
the fact that they are not directly regulated by the Vienna Conven-
tion, this point is debatable. According to some scholars, even inter-
pretative declarations are opposable by and to the declaring State in
certain instances.47
Discerning the real substance of the often complex statements
made by States upon ratification of, or accession to a multilateral
treaty is a matter of construction and must be solved through the
ordinary rules of interpretation. In practice, there seem to be two
primary criteria developed by international judicial bodies to distin-
guish between opposable and non-opposable statements, that is, be-
tween reservations and interpretative declarations. First, a statement
is a true reservation if it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect
of certain provisions, which is something more than just the exclu-
44. See generally ELIAS, supra note 7, at 35; HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 485-95; SIN-
CLAIR, supra note 7, at 44; WHITEMAN, supra note 7, at 137-38; Bishop, supra note 7, at 303-
22; Bowett, supra note 7, at 67-70.
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(l)(d).
46. A simple declaration or understanding is -[un] acte purement unilateral qui ne peut
pas etre invoqu6 pour justifier-par voie de r&iprocit6-une non-application totale ou partielle
du trait6 mais qui, i l'inverse, est inopposable aux autres Etates." Imbert, La question des
reserves dans la Decision Arbitrale du 30 Juin 1977 relative d la delimitation du plateau conti-
nental entre la Rdpublique Franqaise et le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du
Nord, 1978 ANNUAIRE FRAN(;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 29, 33.
47. See McRae, The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
155 (1978). McRae draws a distinction between a "mere interpretative declaration" and a
"qualified interpretative declaration." The former is treated as a non-opposable statement and
the latter as a reservation.
Vol. 15
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sion or modification of the actual terms of certain provisions. Sec-
ond, it is a true reservation if it purports to be a condition set forth by
the State for its acceptance of the treaty.48
Concerning the relationship between the Vienna Convention
and customary international law, it is not easy to ascertain: (1)
which provisions of the Convention were, in 1969, the codification of
a "general practice accepted as law,"4 9 and thus binding qua custom-
ary international law on the whole international community; (2)
which provisions were then the expression of "progressive develop-
ment," and thus binding qua treaty rules only on States which were
parties to the Convention; (3) which provisions did not codify any
existing rule but have since become customary law; and (4) which
provisions were, in 1969, the expression of a general practice acepted
as law but have since lost this character. 50 Notwithstanding the diffi-
culties of classifying any provision in the proper category, the prac-
tices of States and the decisions of international tribunals show a
definite trend towards a greater acceptance of the Vienna Convention
as the expression of the present status of the customary international
law of treaties.5 '
With regard to judicial decisions, the International Court of Jus-
tice, in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,52 stated: "The
rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
48. See Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration Case, 18 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 3,
38-40; Temeltesch Case, [1982] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, paras. 68-82 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights) (Report of May 5, 1982). For comments on this aspect of the
cases, see Bowett, supra note 7, at 90-92; Boyle, The Law of Treaties and the Anglo-French
Continental Shelf Arbitration, 29 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 498 (1980); Imbert, supra note 46, at 29;
Imbert, Les reserves d la Convention europeenne des droits de l'homme devant la Commission de
Strasbourg (Affaire Temeltasch), 87 R.G.D.I.P. 580 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Affaire
Temeltasch].
49. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b).
50. As regards the issue of the interplay between customary and conventional interna-
tional law, see G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 142-147 (W.E. Butler trans.
1974); Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 R.C.A.D.I. 25-106 (1970); Jimenez de Arechaga,
supra note 7, at 12-23.
51. Cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 601; ELIAS, supra note 7, at 5-8; VERDROSS, DIE
QUELLEN DES UNIVERSELLEN VOLKERRECHTS 39 (1973); Briggs, United States Ratification
of the Vienna Treaty Convention, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1979). But cf. Weil, Vers une norma-
tiviti relative en droit international?, 86 R.G.D.I.P. 5, 42-44 (1982) (modified and slightly ex-
panded in the English version Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413, 439-440 (1983)).
52. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. 16.
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concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach
(adopted without a dissenting vote) may in many respects be consid-
ered as a codification of existing customary law on the subject."53
Again, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,5 4 the International Court of
Justice asserted that:
The principle of termination of a treaty by reason of change
of circumstances, . . and the conditions and exceptions to which
it is subject have been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be
considered as a codification of existing customary law.55
In other cases it seems that the International Court of Justice found
it unnecessary to expressly state that the Vienna Convention was
cited as the codification of customary law.56
In addition to the International Court of Justice, other interna-
tional tribunals have acknowledged the customary status of the Vi-
enna Convention. For example, in the Beagle Channel Arbitration
Case,57 the Court of Arbitration, which was established by the Brit-
ish Government pursuant to the Argentina-Chile Treaty of Arbitra-
tion of 1902,58 held that: "[T]he traditional canons of treaty
interpretation [are] now enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which . . . both the Parties have accepted as gov-
erning the matter. . .. ,.9 Additionally, in the Young Loan Arbitra-
tion Case,6 ° the Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German
53. Id. at 47.
54. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Feb. 2).
55. Id. at 18. The one in the text is not the only instance in the Judgment of significant
language. E.g., "There can be little doubt, as is . . . recognized in Article 52 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, that under contemporary international law an agreement
concluded under the threat or use of force is void." Id. at 14.
56. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J.
46, 67 (Judgment of Aug. 18) ("[A]ccording to the definition of a material breach of treaty
contained in Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention .... "); Agean Sea Continental Shelf
Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 1, 39 (Judgment of Dec. 19) ("[T]he Court . . . knows of
no rule of international law which might preclude a joint communiquE from constituting an
international agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement (cf. Arts. 2, 3
and II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)"); Interpretation of the Agreement of
25 March 1951 Between the W.H.O. and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 94-95 ("A
further general indication as to what those obligations may entail is to be found in the second
paragraph of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .... ").
57. Beagle Channel Arbitration Case (Argen. v. Chile), reprinted in 52 INT'L L. REP. 93
(1979).
58. General Treaty of Arbitration, May 28, 1902, Argentina-Chile, 191 Parry's T.S. 215,
reprinted in 95 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 759.
59. Beagle Channel Arbitration Case, supra note 57, at para. 15.
60. Young Loan Arbitration Case (Belg., Fr., Switz., U.K., & U.S. v. W. Germ.), re-
printed in 59 INT'L L. REP. 494 (1980).
Vol. 15
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External Debts relied strongly on the Vienna Convention. The Court
stated:
The international law on treaties. . has been codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. The
provisions of the Convention do not apply in the present proceed-
ings but nevertheless . . . the Convention properly reflects both
the present and the past state of international treaty law, since as
regards interpretation at least, it is restricted to the codification of
customary law in force. This is a view subscribed to not only by
all parties to these proceedings, but by the Tribunal itself in its
previous decisions.
6 1
With regard to the practice of States, the United States, for example,
has often referred to several provisions of the Vienna Convention as
binding international law, even though it is not a party to the
Convention.62
Regarding the provisions relating to reservations, scholars and
practitioners have considered them closer to the codification rather
than the progressive development end of the spectrum of Vienna
Convention norms.6 3 At the Vienna Conference, although the for-
mulation of Articles 19-23 was harshly debated, their final approval
was almost unanimous.' Moreover, international jurisprudence has
61. Id. at 529.
62. In the President's Message submitting the Convention to the Senate it is asserted that
the Convention "is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law
and practice." S. EXEC. Doc. No. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1971). In daily diplomatic corre-
spondence the Vienna Convention is referred to over and over again by U.S. officials. Some
instances include: (a) "The importance for the interpretation of a treaty of subsequent practice
. . . had been expressed inter alia in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties." 1973 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 360; (b) "If a party to the Chicago Convention commits
a material breach of the obligation to ensure the safety of civil aviation, the other parties indi-
vidually have the right to suspend the operation of the Convention in whole or in part with
respect to the defaulting State in accordance with customary international law, as codified in
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." 1973 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L.
307; (c) "Under customary international law, as reflected by Articles 35 and 36 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties . . . , neither rights nor obligations for third parties are
created by a treaty unless the parties to the treaty so intend." 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L.,
701. See also 1977 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L., 107; 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 767, 771,
775.
63. See IMBERT, supra note 7, at 78-81; Baxter, supra note 50, at 48 n.44. Baxter states
that: "[I]ts provisions on reservations (Arts. 19-23) generally reflect the dominant modern
view of the effect of reservations, as it has developed in the practice of States and of the United
Nations."
64. The final vote on each article was as follows: art. 19: 92 in favor, 4 against and 7
abstentions; art. 20: 83, 0, 17; art. 21: 94, 0, 0; art. 22: 98,0,0; art. 23: 90,0,0. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/1 l/Add. 1, at 30, 35, 36, 38, 36 respectively (1969).
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also taken a position on the customary status of the Vienna provi-
sions on reservations.
In the Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf,6" the ad hoc Court of Arbitration, as well as the Parties in their
pleadings, referred several times to the Vienna Convention. Both the
Court and the Parties clearly assumed the current customary status
of the rules on reservations. The Court stated:
The Court shares the opinion of the Parties that the effect of
the French reservations and the United Kingdom's refusal to ac-
cept them has to be appreciated in the light of the law in force at
the time when those acts occurred. Like the Parties, it also recog-
nizes that the law governing reservations to multilateral treaties was
then undergoing an evolution which crystallized only in 1969 in Ar-
ticle 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
66
The references to the Vienna Convention regime on reservations,
made in this case by the Court and the Parties, are of particular sig-
nificance. The treaty at stake was concluded prior to the Vienna Con-
vention, which, by its own terms, "applies only to treaties which are
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Conven-
tion with regard to such States."' 67 Since the Court and the Parties
could not legally invoke any provisions of the Vienna Convention
insofar as treaty rules, their frequent referrals to those provisions
were made only in the context of their being norms of customary
international law. This is especially significant because France has
not signed the Convention, being the only State to vote against its
adoption at the end of the Vienna Conference.
As a recent example of practice substantiating the overall cus-
tomary status 68 of the provisions on reservations, mention may be
made of the Report of the European Commission on Human Rights
relating to the application by Mr. Temeltasch against Switzerland.69
Both the Government of Switzerland, in its pleadings,70 and the
Commission, in its opinion,7 invoked the Vienna Convention to de-
termine whether Switzerland's interpretative declaration on Article
65. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R. INT'L
ARB. AWARDS 3 (1977).
66. Id. at 42-43, para. 38 (emphasis added). See also id. paras. 55, 58, 61. Cf. Boyle,
supra note 48; Bowett, supra note 7, at 90-92; Imbert, supra note 46.
67. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 4 (the so-called non-retroactivity provision).
68. The customary status is "overall" in the sense that it would seem incorrect to draw the
conclusion that every aspect of those provisions has obtained that status.
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6(3)(e) of the European Convention on Human Rights72 could be re-
garded as an actual reservation.73 Switzerland asserted that the Vi-
enna Convention, which it had not signed, was "a source of guidance
in the interpretation of the [European] Convention insofar as it stated
generally accepted principles of international law." 74 Switzerland
quoted the definition of "reservation" in Article 2(l)(d), and referred
to the commentary on the Draft by the International Law Commis-
sion presented at the Vienna Conference.75 While the Vienna Con-
vention could not apply to the European Convention (because of the
aforementioned Article 4 preventing retroactive application), the
Commission upheld the relevance of the Vienna Convention to its
decision, stating:
As Article 64 [of the European Convention] contains no defi-
nition of the term "reservation", the Commission must analyze
this notion, and the notion of "interpretative declaration," as they
are understood in international law. In this regard, it will attach
particular importance to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 23 May 1969, which states above all the existing rules
of customary law, and is essentially in the nature of a
codification.76
The attitude of the American States, especially the United
States, towards the Vienna Convention regime on reservations shows
a very high regard for its customary status. In 1973 the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States approved a set of
Standards on Reservations to Inter-American Multilateral Treaties.77
These Standards replaced the old Inter-American standards of 1932
and 1938 and made them compatible with the Vienna Convention.
Prior to the vote, the United States Representative declared: "In sup-
porting these standards, my delegation wishes to note its belief that
the standards are not inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the
Vienna Convention.
7 8
Moreover, in a Department of State legal memorandum of 1976
there is clear support for the Vienna Convention despite a previous
differing United States position on the matter:
72. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 6(3)(e). This article concerns the right to
have the free assistance of an interpreter.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
74. Temeltesch Case, supra note 48, at para 32.
75. Id. at paras. 33-34.
76. Id. at para. 68. For a comment upon the case, see Affaire Temeltasch, supra note 48.
77. See O.A.S. Doc. OEA/SER. P, AG/Doc.375/73 Rev.I (1973).
78. See 1973 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. at 179.
1985
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There is nothing in the Vienna Convention or in its legislative
history which indicates that reservations may be communicated
only by means of the instrument of ratification. A writing is re-
quired, but there is no specification as to the form that the writing
must take. To the extent that the rule expressed . . . in the Vi-
enna Convention appears to be inconsistent with the views set
forth by Marjorie Whiteman in the Digest of International Law, it
is the Legal Adviser's judgement that the... Vienna Convention
formulations are correct.79
The foregoing instances suffice to demonstrate that, within the
international community, there appears to be a wide acceptance of
the norms on reservations embodied in the Vienna Convention as
customary law. The legal pattern of this subject matter, although
complex, seems to have achieved a certain degree of predictability.
This is instrumental in the development of multilateral treaties as a
tool for the implementation of human rights.
II. RESERVATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
A. In General.
The basic question concerning treaties on human rights is
whether or not they are to be considered as a category separate from
other multilateral treaties, and in particular, whether the rules on
reservations just outlined apply to them with equal force.8 ° State
practice does not seem to differentiate, from the legal point of view,
human rights treaties from other multilateral treaties. It is true,
however, that the terms "reservation" and "human rights" appear to
contradict one another.8" Indeed, an argument may be made that all
such reservations are void because every norm of a human rights
treaty is jus cogens,8 2 (that is, "a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character")., 3
79. See 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. at 216; see also 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. at
263-67.
80. Cf. HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 604-14.
81. Imbert, Reservations and Human Rights Conventions, 6 HUM. RTS. REV. 28 (1981).
82. Cf. HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 607.
83. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 53. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at
512-15; Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 172
R.C.A.D.I. 221 (1981); Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 R.C.A.D.I. 271
(1981); Ronzitti, La disciplina dellojus cogens nella Convenzione di Vienna sul diritto dei trat-
tati, 15 COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 241 (1978).
Vol. 15
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In fact, some provisions of treaties on human rights seem to be
among the best settled examples of jus cogens,"4 assuming that jus
cogens exists.85 However, not all of them appear to be of equal im-
portance. The current trend of general international law seems to be
towards "a distinction between different types of internationally
wrongful acts on the basis of the subject-matter of the international
obligation breached and, more particularly, of the importance which
the international community attaches to obligations relating to cer-
tain matters." 6 In the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), 7 the
International Court of Justice supported this trend with an oft-
quoted assertion:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the obliga-
tions of a State towards the international community as a whole and
those arising vis-A-vis another State in the field of diplomatic pro-
tection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved all States
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes. . . . Such obligations derive, for exam-
ple, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts
of aggression, and of genocide, and as from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including
protection from slavery and racial discrimination.
8 8
In Article 19 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility the Interna-
tional Law Commission distinguishes between an "international
crime" and an "international delict." The former is "the breach by a
State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach
is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole."8 9 The latter
encompasses all other wrongs.
Three concepts flow out of this trend: jus cogens, obligations
erga omnes and international crimes. Although these concepts are
84. The prohibition of slavery and genocide are among the examples quoted by the Inter-
national Law Commission (I.L.C.). 1966 I.L.C. Report, supra note 43, at 248.
85. This is not something to taken for granted. See Weil, supra note 51, passim.
86. Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, [1976] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 97; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SER.A./1976/Add.I (part 2) [hereinafter cited as 1976 I.L.C. Report].
87. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3.
88. Id. at paras. 33-34 (emphasis added).
89. See 1976 I.L.C. Report, supra note 86, at 95. Among the examples of international
crimes given in the draft Article itself is "a serious breach on a widespread scale of an interna-
tional obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid." Cf. Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 7, at 273-
75.
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related to one another it is difficult to reconcile them in the abstract
because it is not clear to what extent they overlap or differ.9° Assum-
ing that these concepts actually have a place in international law,9 it
is fair to say that while the core of human rights obligations is surely
affected by them, it is incorrect to treat all of the international human
rights norms in the same way. The language of Article 19(3)(c) of
the International Law Commission Draft on State Responsibility92 is
eloquent in this respect. The Draft states that "a serious breach on a
widespread scale" cannot be put at the same level as a single violation
of a minor provision.93 For example, a generalized system of
apartheid cannot be compared to the lack of free assistance by an
interpreter. The fact that only a few, if any, provisions of treaties on
human rights could be considered Jus cogens or norms which create
obligations erga omnes, or norms whose breach would be an interna-
tional crime, means that a human rights treaty must be treated like
any other multilateral treaty, even though its ethical meaning is in-
deed different. Accordingly, the effects of reservations must be the
same.
B. Factors Inducing States to Make Reservations
Notwithstanding some scholarly attempts to promote the prohi-
bition of reservations to human rights treaties,94 State practice dem-
onstrates that whenever a treaty has allowed reservations95 States
90. The I.L.C. itself warned against easy assimilations of the three concepts. See 1976
I.L.C. Report, supra note 86, vol. I at 71, 74, 90, and vol. II at 119-20. It is a kind of "mystery
triangle" which is puzzling several international law scholars. See Weil, supra note 51, at 442
(English version) and at 46 (French version). Weil sharply criticizes this trend for confusing
lex lata and lex ferenda and significantly characterizes the mentioned concepts as "legal fash-
ions adorned with the trappings of modernism."
91. If the position is taken that these concepts have not crystallized into norms of interna-
tional law, then the argument that human rights treaties are whollyjus cogens vanishes and the
regime of reservations must be the ordinary one of every multilateral treaty.
92. 1976 I.L.C. Report, supra note 86, at 95.
93. Id.
94. See the Report by Professor I.R. Moreno, Reservations to Treaties Relating to Human
Rights, in International Law Association, Rep. 54th Conf., at 642-45 (1970), where the follow-
ing resolution was proposed: "That the conventions consecrating international recognition of
human rights cannot be subject to reservations by the States when these reservations restrict the
rights they consecrate or annul their effect." Id. at 645 (emphasis added). However, the reso-
lution eventually approved by the International Law Association ended up being strictly adher-
ent to the reality of international practice: "A convention consecrating international
recognition of Human Rights cannot be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and
purpose thereof." Id. at xiv (emphasis added). See also Discussion at the Working Session on
Human Rights, id. at 596-625 (in particular at 603-04, 624).
95. Only two of the numerous treaties on human rights expressly provide that reservations
are forbidden. These are: (1) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Vol. 15
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have made much use of this possibility. 96 States are often motivated
to resort to reservations as a result of many factors other than a mere
unwillingness to respect human rights. In a sphere so sensitive to
State sovereignty there are several legal, political and practical fac-
tors which may induce a State to make one or more reservations
while ratifying, or acceding to, a multilateral treaty on human rights.
One common factor is the presence, in the domestic law of the
State concerned, of a constitutional or statutory provision which is
somewhat inconsistent with the treaty at stake. For example, in re-
gard to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women,97 numer-
ous States have made reservations to the provision which confers
upon women the right to hold public office, since there may be a
conflict with domestic laws on military recruitment.98
Another frequent concern of States in ratifying human rights
conventions is the difficulty of maintaining the constitutional balance
between the jurisdictions of central and local authorities. This is an
especially important concern in States which have a federal system of
government. 99 A related factor is the existence in some States of ter-
ritories with special legal status where reservations of a "geographi-
cal" nature are required."'°  Additionally, some treaties are
inconsistent with each other in some aspects while overlapping in
others. This is the case, for example, with the European Convention
on Human Rights and the two UN International Covenants,'0°
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 40 (1957)
(art. 9: "No reservation may be made to this Convention"), and (2) Convention Against Dis-
crimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (art. 9: "Reservations to this Con-
vention shall not be permitted").
96. See U.N., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Dec. 31, 1982,
ST/LEG.SER.E/2, at 91-145 [hereinafter cited as 1982 U.N. Treaties].
97. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, July 7, 1954, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
98. E.g., the reservations made by Australia, Austria, Denmark, Fiji, Federal Republic of
Germany, India, Italy, Mauritius, New Zealand, Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom. U.N.,
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Dec. 31, 1981, ST/LEG.
SER.E/2, at 492-96 [hereinafter cited as 1981 U.N. Treaties].
99. Cf SCHACHTER, NAWAZ & FRIED, supra note 11, at 107-14; ViTrA, supra note 7, at
9 1; Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations: Colonial Clauses and Fed-
eral Clauses in United Nations Multilateral Instruments, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 108-128 (1951).
100. E.g., the reservations to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights made by the United Kingdom concerning Hong Kong and by the Netherlands concern-
ing the Antilles. 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 114, 116. Cf. VITTA, supra note 7, at 88-
92; Liang, supra note 99.
101. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Economic,
Social and Cultural Covenant]; International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Civil and Politial Covenant]. See Capotorti, Possibilities of Conflict in National Legal Systems
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where several reservations were made by some European States for
this very reason.' 0 2 Sometimes the relevant factor is the unwilling-
ness of national parliaments to go through the laborious and time-
consuming process of enacting new legislation to comply with all of
the treaty provisions. This can occur due to the existence of more
urgent domestic interests, time pressures and other such factors. In a
situation such as this a State may nevertheless ratify the treaty in
order to show its general concern for human rights."0 3 A similar
consideration is the objective impossibility of many less developed
countries to readily comply with certain provisions concerning "sec-
ond generation" human rights. This usually brings about one or
more reservations postponing such provisions, or making their appli-
cation more gradual."°
Another factor which has possibly played at least a diminishing
a role in the use of reservations upon ratification of human rights
treaties is the lack of expertise in the governments of less developed
countries, especially those which have recently gained their indepen-
dence.105 The shortage of personnel capable of grasping the actual
scope of a complex multilateral treaty and its interaction with ex-
isting or prospective legislation, coupled with their inability to per-
form adequate support functions results in a more cautious approach
to the treaty under consideration.' 6 Other problems are created by
Between the European Convention and Other International Agreements, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-93 (A.H. Robertson ed. 1968).
102. E.g., the sixth French reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which states: "The Government of the Republic declares that articles 19, 21 and 22 of
the Covenant will be implemented in accordance with articles 10, 11 and 16 of the European
Convention .. " 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 123.
103. Cf SCHACHTER, NAWAZ & FRIED, supra note 11, at 93-107.
104. See, e.g., the reservation by Madagascar to Article 13 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: "The Government of Madagascar states that it
reserves the right to postpone the application of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, more
particularly in so far as relates to primary education, since, while the Malagasy Government
fully accepts the principles embodied in the said paragraph and undertakes to take the neces-
sary steps to apply them in their entirety at the earliest possible date, the problems of imple-
mentation, and particularly the financial implications, are such that full application of the
principles in question cannot be guaranteed at this stage." 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at
114.
105. See SCHACHTER, NAWAZ & FRIED, supra note 11, at 88-90; Nawaz, The Ratification
of or Accession to Human Rights Conventions, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 576, 579 (1973);
UNITAR, Acceptance of Human Rights Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/15, at 7 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as UNITAR Paper].
106. A different issue concerning the new States is the problem of making anew, confirm-
ing, or withdrawing reservations and objections (at the moment of their succession) to multilat-
eral treaties stipulated before the independence by the former Colonial Powers. See Gaja,
Reservations to Treaties and the Newly Independent States, 1 ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 52-68 (1975).
Vol. 15
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dispute settlement clauses. These clauses confer jurisdiction upon
the International Court of Justice or other judicial bodies, and as a
matter of principle are not accepted by many States for any type of
treaty whatsoever."0 7 Another factor common to several States is
their unwillingness to deal in any way with certain other States for
political or ideological reasons. In this type of case a reservation is
one way to prevent the entry into force of a treaty with regard to a
particular State. By adopting the reservation the State avoids polit-
ical problems such as those which might be caused by the "recogni-
tion" of other States.'08
Finally, a very important factor in this area is that States often
fear the unforeseeable consequences of a general ratification. This is
due to the element of uncertainty present in every treaty. This uncer-
tainty is sometimes aggravated by the vagueness of certain provisions
and the "dynamic force" inherent in human rights treaties.' 0 9 The
simplest manner of avoiding unknown consequences which may af-
fect a State's interest is by the adoption of a reservation. However,
the paradoxical outcome is that many reservations are ultimately
found to be unnecessary.10
In conclusion, several factors might play a role in inducing a
State to make reservations to or refraining from ratifying altogether
to a human rights treaty."' This is true even though the State might
As Professor Gaja points out, the fact that in most cases new States have taken no action with
regard to reservations or objections while notifying their succession to treaties, adds consis-
tency to the argument outlined in the text.
107. Cf Gamble, supra note 7, at 387. Gamble's statistical study shows that twelve per-
cent of all the reservations made to multilateral treaties entered into force from 1947 to 1971
deal with provisions on compulsory settlement of disputes. As an illustration of a State's prac-
tice, see Szafarz, Reservations and Objections in the Treaty Practice of Poland, 6 POL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 245 (1974) ("On analysis of Polish reservations, . . . the most numerous reservations
are those that exclude the judicial and arbitration clauses from the scope of obligations ac-
cepted by Poland"). For a recent discussion of the political role of the World Court, see Falk,
The Role of the International Court of Justice, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 253 (1984).
108. The obvious example is the standard reservation made by most of the Arabic States to
dodge any treaty relationship with Israel. E.g., the reservation made by Syria to both Interna-
tional Covenants: "The accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to these two Covenants shall in
no way signify recognition of Israel or entry into a relationship with it regarding any matter
regulated by the said two Covenants." See 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 115. Cf
SCHACHTER, NAWAZ & FRIED, supra note 11, at 155; Gamble, supra note 7, at 387-88. For
other examples see VITrA, supra note 7, at 88-89.
109. See Imbert, supra note 81, at 30.
110. Id. at 30-31.
11. See Nawaz, supra note 105, at 583-84. Nawaz identifies some possible causes of non-
ratification (or delay in ratification) of human rights treaties, and considers the use of reserva-
tions as a measure which possibly facilitates wider and readier acceptance of such treaties. See
also UNITAR Paper, supra note 105, at 12-13.
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be sympathetic to the rights which are being protected. The ap-
proach of governments to human rights treaties is frequently condi-
tioned by manifold domestic or international inconveniences. Hence,
the likely alternative to ratification with reservations is often non-
ratification, rather than ratification without reservations. The United
States, which has seldom ratified any major post-war treaty on
human rights, provides a very significant example of this point."
12
C. The Scope of the Compatibility Rule
Reservations, as demonstated above, are not evidence per se of a
will not to comply with human rights principles. Moreover, ratifica-
tion by a large number of States is an important goal, at least at this
stage in the development of the international protection of human
rights." 3 As the International Court of Justice observed regarding
the Convention on Genocide, (although the remark is applicable to
any treaty on human rights), "the complete exclusion from the Con-
vention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its
application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and
humanitarian principles which are its basis.""' 4
Not all reservations, however, must be regarded as allowable.
As in the case of any other multilateral treaty, a judgment upon the
admissibility of reservations must be based upon their compatibility
with the object and purpose of the treaty, unless the treaty itself has
special rules. Treaties on human rights often have a variety of gen-
eral provisions which concern the authorization to make reserva-
tions, the prohibition of reservations and the specification of the
provisions which may or may not be subjected to reservations." 
5
Apart from the obvious cases where reservations are either expressly
forbidden or permitted, it is difficult to ascertain whether a reserva-
tion is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
In addressing this issue it is important to analyze the real scope
of the compatibility rule embodied in Article 19(c), and its relation-
ship with the rules on the acceptance of and objection to reservations
of Article 20(4). The two provisions are not easy to reconcile. Arti-
cle 19(c) provides that a State may not formulate a reservation if it is
112. Among the ten treaties listed in the Appendix, only the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women has been ratified by the United States. The U.S. ratified the treaty on April
8, 1976, twenty-two years after its entry into force.
113. See 1966 1.L.C. Report, supra note 43, at 205.
114. 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide, supra note 20, at 24.
115. Cf IMBERT, supra note 7, at 193.
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incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty concerned.I, 6
However, no consequences for such an act are provided for. Article
20(4) provides that a reserving State becomes a party to the treaty
vis-A-vis all the accepting, non-objecting, and "relatively objecting"
States."1 7 Article 20 does not consider the content of the reservation
and its consistency with the object and purpose of the treaty. Thus,
it appears that States are told on the one hand that they are forbidden
from making certain reservations, and on the other that their partici-
pation in the treaty depends only upon the reaction of the other con-
tracting parties, who are free to accept or reject any reservation
regardless of its content.
Two constructions of this apparent contradiction have been pro-
posed. Under one interpretation the only real test for the admissibil-
ity of a reservation is acceptance by the other States." 8  Since
everything depends upon the reaction of the other parties, the com-
patibility rule is irrelevant. Under this interpretation Article 19(c)
can be regarded "as a mere doctrinal assertion which may serve as a
basis for guidance to States regarding acceptance of reservations, but
no more than that."" 19
The compatibility rule is surely difficult to apply. For example,
because it is unclear whether a reservation must be compatible with
the "object and purpose of the treaty," considered as separate crite-
ria, or whether they must be considered together. 20 This ambiguity,
however, would not be important since under this construction the
distinction is not crucial to the admissibility of reservations. 12'
Following this construction, in a dispute between two States a
reservation would be opposable by and to the reserving State, pro-
vided it was not previously objected to by the other State, and even
though it might not be compatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. The hypothetical judicial body would only ascertain whether
116. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 19(c).
117. Id. art. 20(4). As a matter of terminology, "relative objection" is here taken to mean
an objection which does not express a definite intention to preclude the entry into force of the
treaty as between the reserving and objecting State. The time of the entry into force (under
paragraphs (4) and (5) of Article 20) between the two concerned States is: (a) at the moment of
the acceptance if the reservation is expressly accepted; (b) at the moment of the objection if the
reservation is relatively objected; (c) if no position is taken, either twelve months after the silent
State is notified of the reservation or at the moment it ratifies the treaty, whichever is later.
118. See IMBERT, supra note 7, at 137-40; Ruda, supra note 7, at 182-90.
119. Ruda, supra note 7, at 190.
120. That is, the object and the purpose or the object-purpose. See Teboul, supra note 7, at
695-701.
121. See IMBERT, supra note 7, at 138.
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the reservation was accepted or rejected in the first place, while its
content would be relevant only to the interpretation of the actual
rights and obligations of the parties.
According to the second construction 2 . Article 19 and Article
20 raise separate issues. Article 19 governs the issue of the "permis-
sibility" of a reservation, while Article 20 concerns the issue of its
"opposability." If a reservation is incompatible with the object and
purpose of a treaty it is impermissible and therefore illegal.' 23
Whether a reservation is in fact impermissible does not depend on
the reaction of the other parties; rather it is a preliminary legal issue
to be solved as a matter of treaty interpretation. 124 Other States
"may not accept an impermissible reservation."' 12 1 If they do their
acceptance is illegal as well. 126 Since States can accept only permissi-
ble reservations, Article 20 must be considered only after it has been
established that a reservation is permissible. In other words, "the
issue of 'opposability' . . . arises only in relation to a permissible res-
ervation and . . . involves inquiring into the reactions of the Parties
to that reservation and the effects of such reaction."'
127
Utilizing this construction in a dispute between a reserving State
and another party, the second party may always claim that the reser-
vation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. This
is true even though it did not object to the reservation when it had
the opportunity to do so. 128 Therefore, the hypothetical judicial
body would first look into the content of the reservation to determine
whether it is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. If
the answer to this question was affirmative, then it would ascertain
the pattern of treaty obligations between the two States as modified
or excluded by the reservation, along with the related acceptance or
objection. On the other hand, if the answer was negative, the treaty
would not be in force between the two States. In such a situation the
fact that the reservation was accepted or objected to would be
irrelevant. 
29
Both constructions have merit. However, it would seem that the
122. See Bowett, supra note 7, passim.
123. Id. at 77.
124. Id. at 88.
125. Id. at 89.
126. Id. at 83.
127. Id. at 80.
128. Id. at 81.
129. Id. at 88. Bowett states that "the impermissible reservation nullifies the State's accept-
ance of the treaty as a whole."
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first reads too little into Articles 19 and 20 and the second reads too
much. To state that the compatibility rule is "a mere doctrinal asser-
tion," 3° and "devoid of any substance,"'' may be close to reality
but does not provide a legal explanation. On the other hand, to say
that "an impermissible reservation cannot be accepted,"' 32 and that
"a purported 'acceptance' of an impermissible reservation ...
should be regarded as a nullity"' 33 may be desirable de legeferenda.
However, such a construction seems to detract too much from the
legal weight of the sovereign will of States.' 34 Perhaps another con-
struction may be suggested.
The definite rule stated in Article 19(c) of the Vienna Conven-
tion that a State may not formulate a reservation which is incompati-
ble with the object and purpose of a treaty cannot be ignored.
Therefore, a State is clearly under a legal obligation, either conven-
tional (if it is a party to the Vienna Convention), or customary (if this
rule is deemed to be a codification of general international law),' to
refrain from formulating such a reservation upon ratification of a
treaty. 3 6  If a State does formulate such a reservation the act
amounts to a breach of that obligation. Therefore, it is a wrongful
act, entailing such State's international responsibility vis-a-vis each
other party to the treaty. ' It does not amount to a breach of the
130. Ruda, supra note 7, at 190.
131. IMBERT, supra note 7, at 136 ("vid[ie] de toute sa substance;" translation from the
original).
132. Bowett, supra note 7, at 83.
133. Id. at 84.
134. Cf. Weil, supra note 51, at 43 (French version). Weil warns against any hard and fast
conclusion concerning the law of treaties drawn in the wake of certain international legal
trends.
135. For the purpose of the argument it will be assumed that the compatibility rule is
actually part of customary law. The reasonableness of such an assumption has already been
demonstrated. See supra text accompanying notes 49-79.
136. The term "ratification" is used here in the broad sense of expression of consent to be
bound by a treaty. Therefore, it is taken to mean both "ratification" in the strict sense and
"accession." For the difference between the two notions, see BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 604-
605. Concerning the timing of reservations, under the Vienna Convention, only statements
formulated at the moment of ratification are considered true reservations. If formulated before,
they must be confirmed upon ratification (Article 23); if formulated afterwards, they are by
definition nothing more than policy statements devoid of any legal effect whatsoever with re-
gard to the treaty (reading a contrario Article 19). An obvious consequence of these rules is
that a reservation which is formulated rightfully upon ratification may be withdrawn later
(Article 22), but it cannot be broadened. A State is quite free to formulate far-reaching reserva-
tions, but once they are accepted it cannot modify them at will.
137. Cf Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly,
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 30. Article I states:
"Every international wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
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treaty itself, but rather of the general norm embodied in the Vienna
Convention forbidding "incompatible" reservations.
Whether a reservation is in fact incompatible with the object and
purpose of a treaty, that is, whether it constitutes a violation of inter-
national law, is a matter of interpretation. Accordingly, it is correct
to state that this "is eminently a legal question and entirely suitable
for judicial determination."' 38 However, not all other parties to the
treaty would be entitled to claim that such a reservation is improper.
This right depends on their reaction to the reservation itself. Those
States which have objected to such a reservation may subsequently be
able to claim the reserving State's responsibility for having breached
the compatibility rule. t39 In contrast, those States which have ex-
pressly or tacitly accepted the reservation 4 ° do not have the right to
subsequently assert the reserving State's responsibility in relation to
themselves.
There are two rationales for denying a State the right to claim
the incompatibility of a reservation once it has been accepted. Under
either one the practical result would be analogous, although reached
through different legal rationales. One rationale would rely upon the
concept of the "waiver" of a subjective right, while the other would
rely on the concept of "consent" as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness. The rationale which is utilized depends upon the posi-
tion taken concerning the preliminary issue of when a reservation
legally comes into effect.
One view is that a reservation should be considered as an en-
tirely unilateral act which is effective and complete when formulated,
State"; Article 3: "There is an international wrongful act of a State when: (a) conduct consist-
ing of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) that
conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State."
138. Bowett, supra note 7, at 81.
139. The fact that an objection is not motivated by legal reasons does not make any differ-
ence. The point is that since the objecting State has not expressed any form of consent to the
reserving State's wrongful act.
140. Hereinafter "acceptance" means both express and tacit acceptance. As a matter of
fact, the Vienna Convention has equalized under Article 20(5) acceptance and non-objection,
codifying "the international practice concerning multilateral conventions [where] very great
allowance [is] made for tacit assent to reservations." 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide,
supra note 20, at 21. While the twelve month deadline of Article 20(5) is probably not custom-
ary, "[tihat the principle of implying consent to a reservation from absence of objection has
been admitted into State practice cannot be doubted." 1966 I.L.C. Report, supra note 43, at
208. A further distinction might be drawn between "tacit" and "implied" acceptance. The
former occurs when the twelve-month deadline expires without any objection, while the latter
occurs when a State accedes to a treaty without objecting to reservations previously formulated
by States already parties to the treaty. See VirrA, supra note 7, at 53-54.
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regardless of the reaction of the other parties to the treaty. This was
formerly the position of the socialist States, 141 which contended that
a State does not "formulate" (that is propose) a reservation, but
"makes" it.' 42 As a consequence of this doctrine, a reservation
comes into existence for all the other parties at the moment of the
reserving State's ratification. Assuming that this reservation was in-
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, the wrongful
act is committed at the same moment. If another party to the treaty
accepts such a reservation, its consent cannot preclude the wrongful-
ness of the act because the act took place at a previous stage. How-
ever, since this other party freely expressed its approval of the other
State's wrongful conduct it is deemed to have waived its subjective
right to claim the other State's responsibility as a consequence of the
wrongful conduct. The International Law Commission, in its Report
on State Responsibility,'43 claimed that "there is no doubt that if the
consent is given only after the commission of the act (ex post facto), it
will simply amount to a waiver of the right to assert responsibility
and the claims arising therefrom. But, with such a waiver, the
wrongfulness of the prior act remains. '
If the view is shared that reservations are fully unilateral acts,
the first legal rationale to be followed relies on the notion of
"waiver," which is the conscious unilateral relinquishment of a
known subjective right.'45 However, the premise that a reservation is
141. See, for example, the Soviet Union statement of January 13, 1951, in 1951 Advisory
Opinion on Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. Pleading 21, and the USSR Explanatory Memorandum on
the Question of Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, supra note 43. Cf. IMBERT, supra note 7,
at 98- 101; Bishop, supra note 7, at 335-36; Cassese, Su alcune "riserve" alla Convenzione sui
diritti politici della donna, 51 RIVISTA DI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE [R.D.I.] 294, 300-05
(1968).
142. The distinction between "formulating" (i.e. proposing) and "making" a reservation
was clearly stated by Sir H. Waldock in his first Report to the I.L.C. See Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties
[1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 62, 65. The distinction has eventually survived in the Vienna
Convention. Under Article 19 a State may "make" a reservation only if the treaty itself autho-
rizes it-thus "not requir[ing] any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States"--
and may only "formulate" it in every other case. Cf. IMBERT, supra note 7, at 83-86.
143. Report of the International Law Commission to the U.N. General Assembly, Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 113 [hereinafter cited as 1979
I.L.C. Report].
144. Id.
145. See E. Suy, LES ACTES JURIDIQUES UNILATERAUX EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUB-
LIC 153-187 (1962); Alaimo, Natura del consenso Nell'illecito internazionale, 65 R.D.I. 257,
262-64 (1982); Venturini, La portee et les effets juridiques des attitudes et des actes unilatoraux
des Etats, 112 R.C.A.D.I. 363, 394-96 (1964). But see Rubin, The International Legal Effects
of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM J. INT'L L. 1, 13-15 (1977).
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a fully unilateral act does not appear to be substantiated by interna-
tional practice. There appears to be more support for a "bilateral"
concept of reservations. The International Court of Justice stated the
point boldly: "[I]t is well established that in its treaty relations a
State cannot be bound without its consent, and that consequently no
reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement
thereto." 
14 6
The travaux preparatoires at the Vienna Conference show that
most States view reservations as being ineffective against a State
which has not accepted the reservation.1 47 As a matter of fact, an
amendment proposed by China purporting to replace the words "for-
mulate a reservation" with the words "make reservations" was re-
jected.'4 8 The Vienna Convention itself, in Article 20(4)(c), seems to
confirm that a ratification containing a reservation is effective to-
wards other parties only as a result of their consent to that end.149 In
addition, scholars are practically unanimous in affirming that a reser-
vation only becomes effective vis-A-vis another State when agreement
to the reservation is expressed in one way or another.15 ° Therefore a
second view must be utilized. This view leads to the "consent" ra-
tionale as the basis for denying a State the right to assert that a reser-
vation is impermissible.
This second viewpoint postulates that a reservation is completed
only when accepted by other States. In this regard, the reservation is
not a truly unilateral act because it is unilaterally "formulated," but
not unilaterally "made." The formulation amounts only to "a propo-
sal and not a completed and operative reservation."' 5 1 As such, each
act which expresses a State's consent to be bound by a treaty and
which contains a reservation is effective vis-A-vis any other party at
the moment of their acceptances of, or objections to the reserva-
146. 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide, supra note 20, at 21. See also Ambatielos Case
(Greece v. U.K.), 1952 I.C.J. 76 (dissenting opinion of Judge Zoricic where a reservation is
significantly defined as "a provision agreed upon between the parties to a treaty with a view to
restricting the application of one or more of its clauses or to clarifying their meaning." Id. at
76.
147. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/I 1, at 107-38 (1969); U.N. Doc A./CONF.39/1 1/Add.1,
at 29-38 (1969).
148. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ll, at 121 (1969).
149. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 20(4)(c). Article 20(4)(c) provides: "an act ex-
pressing a state's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as
soon as at least one other contracting state has accepted the reservation."
150. See, e.g., IMBERT, supra note 7, at 97-108; McNAIR, supra note 7, at 162; VITTA,
supra note 7, at 49-57; Anderson, supra note 7, at 452-54; Bishop, supra note 7, at 255; Fitz-
maurice, supra note 7, at 274-79; Ruda, supra note 7, at 179;
151. Fitzmaurice, supra note 7, at 275.
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tion. '52 If the reservation is incompatible with the object and pur-
pose of the treaty, it constitutes a wrongful act committed by the
reserving State towards any other party to the treaty. Since an ac-
ceptance of the reservation amounts to an agreement on the proposed
modification of the treaty between the two parties concerned, those
parties accepting the reservation are deemed to agree with the other-
wise wrongful act. This precludes future claims of responsibility in
their respective relations with the reserving State. Since consent is
given at the same time the reservation becomes effective, it consti-
tutes a circumstance which precludes the wrongfulness of the partic-
ular State's act of making an impermissible reservation.153
There should be no doubt that the principle of volenti non fit
injuria applies in international law as a circumstance which precludes
wrongfulness. This was clearly demonstrated by the International
Law Commission in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Arti-
cle 29(1) reads:
The consent validly given by a State to the commission by
another State of a specified act not in conformity with an obliga-
tion of the latter State towards the former State precludes the
wrongfulness of the act in relation to that State to the extent that
the act remains within the limits of that consent.
1 54
The consent to an act, which, without such consent would constitute
a breach of an obligation towards the consenting State, "really
amounts to an agreement between the two subjects, [that isJ an
agreement which has the effect of rendering the obligation inopera-
tive in that particular case." ' 5 Logically, the consent given by one
State cannot preclude the wrongfulness of an act in relation to other
152. The reservation comes into existence, vis-i-vis the objecting States, at the moment of
their objections because with these acts they recognize its existence although they do not con-
sent to the proposed modification of the treaty. Hence, if the reservation is, in fact, "incompati-
ble," they retain the right to subsequently invoke the reserving State's responsibility. This
would be true even if an objecting State has rejected the entry into force of the whole treaty
with regard to the reserving State because the obligation breached does not come from the
treaty itself but from the supposedly general norm--codified in the Vienna Convention-for-
bidding such reservation.
153. See Ago, Eighth Report to the LL.C. on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 37. Ago writes: "Consent of the injured State can constitute a circumstance preclud-
ing the wrongfulness of the conduct adopted by a State in a particular case, provided that such
consent is given prior to or at the time of the conduct in question." If consent is given after the
act is committed it constitutes a waiver, that is, the forbearance "to pursue the consequences
arising out of the wrongful act (including a claim to reparation)." Id. at 37.
154. 1979 I.L.C. Report, supra note 143, at 109.
155. Id. See also Alaimo, supra note 145, at 269-74.
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States which have not consented to it. 156 However, as regards the
consenting State, there is freedom to accept whatever reservation is
proposed.
If the compatibility rule of Article 19(c) limited this freedom, it
would be impossible to legally express such consent and States could
not accept an "incompatible" reservation. While the 1951 Advisory
Opinion on Genocide set forth the compatibility rule as a limit both
for reservations and for acceptances or objections, 57 the Vienna
Convention keeps the rule only with respect to reservations.1
5 8
Therefore, the limits to the acceptance of or objection to a reserva-
tion are the same limits proper to any international agreement, that
is, its validity. '
59
There is one limit in particular which precludes the acceptance
of particularly outrageous reservations. Consent cannot be given
with respect to a reservation which purports to derogate from a norm
of jus cogens. The International Law Commission has expressly
taken into account this limit on consent as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness. This limit is codified in Article 29(2) of its Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility. 60 The explanation of the Commission
is that:
[I]f one accepts the existence in international law of rules ofjus
cogens . . . one must also accept the fact that conduct of a State
which is not in conformity with an obligation imposed by one of
these rules must remain an internationally wrongful act even if the
injured State has given its consent to the conduct in question.'
6 1
Sincejus cogens is "the only real exception to the general princi-
ple of consent as circumstance precluding wrongfulness,"' 6 2 States
may respectively formulate and accept reservations to any treaty rule
which is not of peremptory character. Unless the compatibility rule
itself is deemed to be a norm ofjus cogens, which appears to be highly
156. See 1979 I.L.C. Report, supra note 143, at 114 ("it is obvious that such an agree-
ment-like any other agreement-produces effects only as between the parties").
157. 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide, supra note 20, at 24.
158. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 19.
159. 1979 I.L.C. Report, supra note 143, at 109 (art. 29(1)). Consent must be "validly
given," that is to say in compliance with the customary rules-mostly codified in Part V, Sec-
tion 2 of the Vienna Convention-on invalidity of international agreements.
160. Id. Article 29(2) provides that: "Paragraph I does not apply if the obligation arises
out of a peremptory norm of general international law." The second part of the paragraph
reproduces exactly the same notion of jus cogens codified in article 53 of the Vienna
Convention.
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unlikely,' 63 the rule cannot prevent States from agreeing to reserva-
tions which are incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty.
As a result, it appears incorrect to assert that a State "cannot, under
the guise of a reservation . . .seek to find acceptance for a legal
proposition which is at variance with, or even concerned with, rules
of law based upon rules of customary international law."' 6 4
It is generally accepted that States can modify by agreement cus-
tomary norms between themselves, unless they are norms of jus
cogens.165 Accordingly, it is possible for States, through an accepted
reservation, to modify inter se a customary norm not of peremptory
character. The customary norm may be either codified in the treaty
itself or unrelated to it. The dictum of the International Court of
Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 6 6 (that reservations
are not possible with regard to treaty provisions which codify cus-
tomary law) is unpersuasive. 167 The fact that a certain norm is rec-
ognized as customary international law cannot prevent States from
making an agreement providing for the modification or exclusion of
that norm as between themselves. Otherwise, any difference between
jus dispositivum and jus cogens would be nullified and all customary
law would be deemed to be jus cogens. An agreement to modify a
customary norm can be a separate treaty. It may also take the tech-
nical form of an accepted reservation to a multilateral treaty which
purports to codify that norm. Not only is such a reservation possi-
ble, but if it draws many acceptances it can be advanced as relevant
evidence against the purported customary status of the reserved pro-
vision.168 As pointed out by Judge Sorenson's dissenting opinion in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Case:
163. It is already a difficult task, by itself, to prove that the compatibility rule is even an
"ordinary" customary international law rule (i.e., a norm ofjus dispositivum).
164. Bowett, supra note 7, at 73.
165. See MORELLI, supra note 7, at 36; THIERRY, COMBACAU, SUR & VALLIE, supra note
7, at 149-151; D'Amato, Treaties as a Source of General Rules of International Law, 3 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 28-31 (1962); Quadri, Cours geniralede droit international public, 113 R.C.A.D.I.
237, 335-40 (1964).
166. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Den. v. W. Germ.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgement of
Feb. 20).
167. Id. at 39-40. The Court commented: "Customary law rules ... cannot therefore be
subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exerciseable at will." The ambiguity of this dictum
arises from the Court's reference to a "right of unilateral exclusion," while reservations imply a
right of bilaterally agreed exclusion. Some of the dissenting opinions and several authors have
questioned the Court's assertion. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 13; H. THIRLWAY, INTER-
NATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 120-21 (1972); Baxter, supra note 50, at 48-
50; Teboul, supra note 7, at 690.
168. See Baxter, supra note 50, at 50.
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The acceptance, whether tacit or express of a reservation
made by a contracting party does not have the effect of depriving
the Convention as a whole, or the relevant article in particular, of
its declaratory character. It only has the effect of establishing a
special contractual relationship between the parties concerned
within the general framework of the customary law embodied in
the Convention. Provided the customary rule does not belong to
the category ofjus cogens, a special contractual relationship of this
nature is not invalid as such.
1 6 9
In summary, where nojus cogens is involved, under the Vienna
Convention rules States are free to accept any reservation by another
State regardless of its content. This is true even where the reserva-
tion is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.'
70
Once a State accepts such a reservation its illegality is precluded as
far as the reserving and the accepting States are concerned. As a
result, it will be impossible to raise it as an issue in a subsequent
dispute between the two States. 171 It is still a basic principle of inter-
national law that States can modify inter se previous or more general
conventional or customary obligations as long as the obligations are
not of peremptory character. 1
72
169. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 166, at 249 (noting also the dissenting
opinions of Judges Tanaka, at 183, and Morelli, at 199). As has been shown, the real limitation
upon the possibility of making reservations is neither the compatibility rule nor customary
international law. Since an accepted reservation is basically in the nature of a bilateral agree-
ment, it is limited only by its consistency with jus cogens, if the existence of jus cogens is as-
sumed. Indeed, an argument may be made that a reservation incompatible with the object and
purpose of a treaty tends necessarily to be againstjus cogens as well. This appears to be a sound
argument from the factual point of view, because a reservation to a human rights treaty which
is incompatible with that treaty's object and purpose can be also a violation of a norm ofjus
cogens. However, from the legal point of view the two concepts are distinct, and it is not
correct to consider such an equivalence as a general rule.
170. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the following considerations by Professor Bowett,
who states: "The contradiction in the conduct of a Party which accepts a treaty and then
accepts a reservation which it acknowledges to be contrary to the object and purpose of that
same treaty is self-evident. Thus, the conclusion ought to be that impermissible reservations
cannot be accepted." Bowett, supra note 7, at 83. Such conduct would certainly be inconsis-
tent, but it would be wholly legal. Professor Bowett himself seems to acknowledge this when
he comments: "[O]f course, it is always possible for the parties, by agreement, to vary custom-
ary rules in their treaty regime (assuming the rules are not part of thejus cogens)." Id. at 74
n.1.
171. As mentioned, if the acceptance of the reservation is considered to be only a "waiver,"
it would not preclude the wrongfulness of the act but would nevertheless prevent any assertion
of the reserving State's responsibility and any claim (e.g. reparation) arising therefrom.
172. Some authors, in the context of quasi-sociological studies, have made assertions that
from the legal viewpoint seem less than sound. See Koh, supra note 7, at 74. Koh writes that
"the compatibility of the substance of the reservation with the 'object and purpose' of the treaty
. ..is the rational constraint placed on a State's power to consent or to oppose a reservation,"
Vol. 15
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The real scope of the compatibility rule of Article 19(c) is lim-
ited by the consent of States since it applies only when such consent
is lacking. An hypothetical judicial body would first determine
whether a reservation was accepted or objected to. Only in instances
where a State objected to the reservation would it seek to discover
whether the reserving State has violated international law vis-a-vis
the objecting State by formulating a reservation incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty vis-A-vis the objecting State. As
a result, it appears to be incorrect to state that the incompatibility of
a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty "has no prac-
tical juridical importance."' 73 In instances where a reservation is ob-
jected to the compatibility rule retains its full value.
Moreover, it is only partially correct to say that "each State may
finally decide the matter for itself." '74 This is true only when a State
accepts a reservation. When a State objects to a reservation, the
question of the reservation's validity is still at issue. It is a fiction to
assume that States, when objecting to a reservation, impliedly assert
incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. States usu-
ally accept and object to reservations on the basis of their own legal
and political interests and policies. States have rarely asserted that
they were objecting to a reservation because they deemed it to be
incompatible with the treaty.' 75 Thus, an objection to a reservation
(in addition to the effects provided for in Article 2 1) simply leaves the
door open for a possible subsequent claim against the reserving State
concerning the "incompatibility", that is, the illegality of the reserva-
tion. If such a dispute arises, such illegality becomes a routine legal
question to be answered through the procedures available in interna-
tional law.
The scope of the compatibility rule, therefore, depends de facto
on the number of objections made by States. Since States do not ap-
and that "the unanimous consent of the parties is neither necessary nor sufficient to validate the
reservation; indeed such consent may be simply irrelevant." This assertion overlooks the sover-
eign will of States as the primary source of international law. Agreement between sovereign
States is still sufficient to derogate from any customary rule whatsoever, including the "object
and purpose" rule. In theory, as mentioned above, the only limit to the will of States as ex-
pressed in international agreements is the doctrine of jus cogens; in practice it is doubtful
whether such will undergoes any limit at all.
173. Ruda, supra note 7, at 190.
174. Id.
175. See, for example, the objection made by Czechoslovakia to the Spanish reservations
with respect of Articles I, II and III of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, "on
the grounds that they are incompatible with the objectives of the Convention." 1981 U.N.
Treaties, supra note 98, at 497.
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pear to be very eager to oppose the reservations of other States, 176 the
role played by the compatibility rule becomes rather narrow. On the
other hand, of all the reservations made to multilateral treaties most
are of fairly minor importance; only a small number (roughly six per-
cent) can be classified as "major substantive" reservations. 77 Thus,
there are not many opportunities for the application of the compati-
bility rule even within the outlined limits.
The legal picture appears to be the same regarding particular
human rights treaties. An argument may be made that the object
and purpose of a human rights treaty must be interpreted in a more
rigorous manner, given the particular obligations involved. Yet, be-
cause the compatibility rule does not apply when States accept reser-
vations, such rigorous interpretation must, in any event, yield to the
acceptances of States. As a result, from a practical viewpoint the
primary issue concerning treaties on human rights is not whether res-
ervations are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty,
but whether States do, in fact, object to reservations made in regard
to such treaties.
D. The Relevance of Objections to Reservations
In accordance with the conclusion that the admissibility of res-
ervations can be questioned only when there are objections (unless
the treaty otherwise provides), it is relevant to establish the frequency
with which objections to reservations are made. In addition, it is also
important to determine whether they have a real impact on the con-
ventional obligations of States.'7 8 Examination of the post-1951 trea-
ties on human rights open to universal participation which have
entered into force shows that only a small number of States have
objected to the reservations of other States. Furthermore, as new
conventions enter into force, the trend is clearly toward a smaller
number of objections. 17
While States still deem it useful to formulate reservations, objec-
tions are becoming less frequent and are often not motivated by legal
176. See IMBERT, supra note 7, at 376-83 (where the rarity of objections to reservations is
shown in detail).
177. See Gamble, supra note 7, at 383-91. The figures in this study relate to all multilateral
treaties entered into force between 1947 and 1971.
178. The 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide is the turning point of the general law of
reservations. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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reasons.180  For example, the sole objecting State to the Apartheid
Convention l18 was merely declaring its disapproval of the political
statements by other States against it.' 82 This shows on the one hand
that objections, like reservations, still have a place in the context of
human rights treaties as political tools and as opportunities to make
unilateral statements. 183 On the other hand, this may also show how
objections, unlike reservations, are no longer regarded as effective
legal tools, at least with respect to human rights treaties.
There is little question about the validity of the above arguments
when viewed in the context of the scope of objections under the Vi-
enna Convention. Article 21(3) provides that "when a State ob-
jecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the
treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which
the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the
extent of the reservation."'84 In addition, Article 21(1) provides that
a reservation modifies for a reserving State, in its reciprocal relations
with all the accepting (or non-objecting) States, "the provisions of the
treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reserva-
tion.' ' I8 5 Thus, it is difficult, prima facie, to see the difference, if any,
between the legal effects of an objection to and an acceptance of a
reservation. In both cases the reciprocal treaty relations between the
two States concerned are modified "to the extent of the reservation."
When, as in most cases, the treaty remains in force between the
reserving and the objecting States, it can be argued that "ultimately,
the legal effects of an objection [to], and an acceptance of a reserva-
tion are identical."' 86 However, an interpretation based upon certain
views expressed at the Vienna Conference, 187 and on the maxim ut
180. Id.
181. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Apartheid Convention].
182. The objecting State was Israel, while the two States whose reservations were objected
to were Kuwait and Egypt. Kuwait and Egypt had made the usual "non-recognition" reserva-
tion in relation to Israel. At a later stage Egypt withdrew its reservation; accordingly, the
related Israeli objection must be regarded as dropped as well.
183. Such unilateral statements might have certain legal effects depending upon their con-
tent and on the value to be assigned to unilateral declarations in international law.
184. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 21(3) (emphasis added).
185. Id. art. 21(1) (emphasis added).
186. Ruda, supra note 7, at 200; See also Cassese, A New Reservations Clause, in REC.
GUGGENHEIM 266, 280-81 (1968); Chaumont, Cours gindrale de droit international public, 129
R.C.A.D.I. 333, 448 (1970).
187. Cf. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ll/ADD.1, at 181 (1969) (statements of Mr. Ago and
Mr. Yasseen). Cf also IMBERT, supra note 7, at 152-59, 260-68.
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res magis valeat quam pereat, leads to a possible distinction between
two cases. 188 If a reservation is only meant to modify the legal effect
of a particular treaty provision, an objection would completely pre-
clude the application of the whole provision as between the two par-
ties. An acceptance would leave the provision in force between them,
as modified. Conversely, if a reservation is meant to exclude the legal
effect of a treaty provision, an objection or an acceptance would have
the same effect; it would preclude application of the provision be-
tween the two parties. Whichever interpretation of Article 21 is uti-
lized, the difference between acceptance of and objection to a
reservation is currently rather obscure.
Before the Vienna Convention the difference was obvious. If a
State had objected to a reservation without further specifications the
whole treaty would not have entered into force as between that State
and the reserving State. Under the Vienna Convention, however,
States must definitely speak out if they want an objection to have that
same effect.' 8 9 In light of the dynamics of international relations this
onus seems to make a great difference, at least with respect to human
rights treaties.'90 The practice of States confirm this impression.' 9'
Recent practice shows a difference in the use of objections by States
between treaties entered into force before the adoption of the Vienna
Convention (May 23, 1969) and treaties entered into force thereafter.
For example, none of the States which made reservations to the Ge-
nocide Convention192 could avoid objections. Twenty-two States
made one or more reservations, and all of the States had at least one
reservation which was objected to by another State. As to the Con-
188. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(l)(d) (where a reservation is defined as a
unilateral statement which purports to exclude or to modify the legal effects of a treaty
provision).
189. This reversal of the presumption was sponsored at the Vienna Conference by the So-
viet Union. This was consistent with the notion of reservations asserted by the States of the so-
called communist bloc. According to this doctrine, and as a consequence of the fundamental
principle of States' sovereignty, every State has the inalienable right to make any reservation
whatsoever. Such reservations have their purported legal effects regardless of other States'
attitudes. Cf. Bishop, supra note 7, at 335-36; Cassese, supra note 141, at 300-05. Today such
an extreme position appears to be abandoned, and Soviet authors take into account the role
played by consent in the law of reservations. See TUNKIN, supra note 50, at 98-99.
190. Sinclair, supra note 7, at 43. Sinclair foresaw the possible consequences of this re-
versed presumption when he wrote: "Finally, there is the psychological consideration that the
onus is now on the innocent party (that is to say the objecting State) to declare publicly that it
does not intend to have treaty relations with the reserving State; this is an onus which smaller
States may find difficult to discharge when the reserving State is a powerful neighbor."
191. See Appendix
192. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention].
Vol. 15
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vention on the Political Rights of Women, 93 of the forty-two reserv-
ing States, fourteen drew one or more objections. 94 However, in
later treaties the use of objections has diminished greatly, while the
use of reservations has still enjoyed great favor among States. This
shift in the attitude coincides with the adoption of the Vienna Con-
vention, but began long before its actual entry into force (January 27,
1980). This strengthens the argument that the Vienna Convention,
and in particular its regime on reservations, is in large part a codifica-
tion of customary international law. As such, the norms either pre-
dated the Vienna Convention or, as in this case, crystallized shortly
thereafter.
The impairment of the legal role of objections brought about by
the Vienna Convention is a phenomenon which affects all multilat-
eral treaties. However, its impact is magnified in regard to human
rights treaties. In this area the obligations of States have a less con-
tractual character because every State undertakes to abide by certain
rules which for the most part concern the treatment of its own citi-
zens. 1 5 The concept of reciprocity, which is common to most inter-
national law issues, does not work here in the usual way because the
notion of contractual balance between the rights and duties of States
is quite altered.196
This does not mean, however, that there is a difference between
the legal structures of human rights treaties and other multilateral
treaties. Technically they are the same. There is, however, a psycho-
logical difference which resides in the motivation of States. When
their own interests are not at stake States usually do not have as
much incentive to request other States to comply with the treaty.
Because human rights treaties are less "contractual" than other trea-
ties, some legal doctrines, such as inadimplenti est inadimplendum,
are not always applicable. It should be noted that this is clearly not a
193. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, supra note 97.
194. There are still a fair amount of objections in the context of the Convention for the
Suppression of Traffic in Persons, and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, July 25,
1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 271. Only at first glance has this Convention registered less objections than
the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. In fact, in proportion to the number of
reserving States, the number of States whose reservations were objected to is rather close to that
of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (4 out of 14 (28%) as compared with 14
out of 42 (33%)).
195. Cf. Cassese, supra note 186, at 268.
196. See. IMBERT, supra note 7, at 153; Virally, La rdciprocit dans le droit international,
122 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 26-27 (1967). Cf. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention & Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings 59-69 (written statement by G. Fitz-
maurice of the U.K.).
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question of the old-fashioned distinction between treaty-law and
treaty-contract. Such a distinction is generally regarded today as
neither useful nor acceptable. 97
An objection to a reservation by a State, in the context of a
treaty concerning the treatment of its own citizens, is not an effective
countermeasure that can be used to place pressure on the reserving
State. Furthermore, it leaves the objecting State with a sense of frus-
tration because it still must comply with all the treaty provisions vis-
A-vis the other parties. Such an objection, however, might have some
symbolic value, either as a bargaining chip to obtain the withdrawal
of the reservation or as a statement of policy on certain matters. As
to the compatibility rule, the limited use made of objections confirms
that its practical role in human rights treaties tends to be minor.
III. RESERVATIONS PROPOSED BY THE U.S. EXECUTIVE WITH
RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Very few treaties on human rights have been ratified by the
United States. The general legal and political problems involved in
the ratification by the United States of such treaties have been dis-
cussed at length by several writers and need not be recalled here.' 98
Ratification of human rights treaties, however, continue to be period-
ically debated. The issue was last discussed under the Carter Admin-
istration in connection with a foreign policy generally concerned
about human rights.' 99 Under that administration there was an at-
tempt by President Carter to obtain from the Senate the required
197. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 63; MORELLI, supra note 7, at 33-34; THIERRY, COM-
BACAU, SUR & VALLtE, supra note 7, at 45-47. Therefore, the distinction put forth by some
writers between "normative treaties" and "contractual treaties" can only be accepted as non-
legal. Cf. Koh, supra note 7, at 75-76.
198. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 154-56, 394
nn. 71, 76, 85 & 91-93 (1972); U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Lillich
ed., 1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. RATIFICATION]; Dearborn, The Domestic Legal Effect of
Declarations that Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEx. L. REV. 233 (1979); Hen-
kin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012
(1968); Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Rights: American and Human]; Noble, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as
the Law of the Land, 25 VILL. L. REV. 119 (1979-80); Schachter, The Obligation of Parties to
Give Effect to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 462 (1979); Skel-
ton, The United States Approach to Ratification of the International Covenants on Human
Rights, 1 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 103 (1979); Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human
Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REv. 35 (1978).
199. See R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 824-871 (1979).
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advice and consent for the ratification2 °° of four major treaties on
human rights.
On February 23, 1978, President Carter transmitted to the Sen-
ate four human rights treaties. These treaties were: (1) the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination;20' (2) the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights;20 2 (3) the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; 2 3 and (4) the American Convention on Human
Rights.2° Annexed to the President's Message were two Depart-
ment of State reports describing the treaties. There were also in-
cluded a number of reservations, declarations and understandings.20 5
Since the treaties have never received the support of the two-thirds
majority of the Senate needed for ratification, the reservations, decla-
rations and understandings have perhaps lost any practical mean-
ing.206 A short comment on the statements, however, is appropriate
in light of the previous considerations.
In examining the three human rights treaties open to universal
participation,20 7 three of the recommended statements are common
to each one: (1) a declaration indicating the non-self-executing char-
acter of the treaties, (2) a reservation preserving the freedom of ex-
pression and (3) a reservation concerning the jurisdiction of States
and of the federal government. In addition, two of the proposed
statements are common only to the two Covenants: (1) a declaration
concerning private property rights and (2) an understanding on pro-
200. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
201. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). This was adopted in resolu-
tion form by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 21, 1965 in G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Racial
Discrimination].
202. Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 101.
203. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 101.
204. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. (No. 36) at 1,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev.1 Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970 [hereinafter cited
as American Convention].
205. See Message from the President of the United States to the Senate Transmitting Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 95-C, D, E and F, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978), reprinted in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 198, at 83-198 [hereinafter cited as
Message].
206. A word of caution is necessary on the loss of the practical meaning of the recom-
mended statements. Reportedly, should the current Administration resubmit these treaties to
the Senate, approximately the same reservations, declarations and understandings would be
proposed again.
207. The American Convention is the only one of the four treaties not open to universal
participation.
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gressive implementation. Lastly, four statements pertain to the Con-
vention on Racial Discrimination: (1) a reservation concerning
capital punishment, (2) a reservation concerning the right to compen-
sation and revoked penalties, (3) an understanding on double jeop-
ardy and (4) an understanding related to racial discrimination in
private activities.
A. The Non-Self-Executing Character of the Treaties
The proposed declaration that the provisions of the treaties are
not self-executing/°s is not relevant from an international legal per-
spective. The statement would not be a true reservation, since it
would not modify or exclude the international legal effect of any pro-
vision of the treaties.219 Whether a treaty is self-executing is an issue
which pertains entirely to the municipal law of the single contracting
parties.21 0 International law is not concerned with the means by
which States comply with their international obligations (that is,
whether they require legislative or administrative acts in order to ex-
cute the treaty). From the standpoint of international law only the
act of ratification is legally relevant. In order to constitute a true
reservation the declaration must modify or exclude the international
legal effect of treaty provisions, not their domestic legal effect.
In numerous States (for example, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom), a legislative act of the parlia-
ment, legally unrelated to the ratification, is required to execute a
treaty. In these countries treaties are never self-executing in the same
sense as in United States law. Therefore, the declaration at issue has
no tangible effect upon the United States. Since those States could
not legally justify failure to comply with their treaty obligations, the
failure of United States could not be justified either.2 1" ' Thus,
whether United States courts deem the declaration effective is only
an issue of domestic law.2 12 As a result, if a specific treaty obligation
208. Message, supra note 205, at 93, 97, 103. "The United States declares that the provi-
sions of. . . this Convention are not self-executing.").
209. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(l)(d).
210. Cf. Schachter, supra note 198, at 464 n.11; Schachter, Intervention at International
Human Rights Treaties. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US. Sen-
ate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
211. It is a very well settled rule of customary international law-now codified in Article
27 of the Vienna Convention-that a State cannot set forth its domestic law as a justification
for failing to perform a treaty obligation.
212. The declaration might be deemed to be an unconstitutional attempt to legislate by the
Senate alone, without the required participation of the House. Cf. Dearborn, supra note 198,
passim; Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note
Vol. 15
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is violated by such a construction the United States would be interna-
tionally responsible.
B. Freedom of Expression
The reservation on freedom of expression213 is probably the only
necessary reservation.214 It has been criticized for being too "sweep-
ing" because it refers not only to the Constitution, but also to the
"laws and practices of the United States."2 5 From an international
legal perspective, however, it constitutes a true reservation and
would probably not attract any objection by other States.
Article 4 of the Convention on Racial Discrimination,216 Article
5 of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant,217 and Article 20
of the Civil and Political Covenant 2 " are the targets of this reserva-
tion. In particular, Article 4 of the Convention on Racial Discrimi-
nation and Article 20 of the Civil and Political Covenant might be
regarded as inconsistent with the freedom of speech and press clauses
of the First Amendment. 21 9 For example, Article 4 of the Conven-
tion on Racial Discrimination prohibits "all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, ' 220 and Article 20 of the Civil
and Political Covenant prohibits "any propaganda for war" and "any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred."22'
On the other hand, Article 5 of the Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Covenant is perhaps only indirectly inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Consequently, the reservation seems to be redundant.
This view is confirmed by the fact that no State has made a reserva-
198, at 23-24; Rovine & Goldklang, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings,
U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 198, at 59-61; Weissbrodt, supra note 198, at 66-72; Weston,
U.S. Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 198, at 37-38.
213. Message, supra note 205, at 91, 95, 98 ("The Constitution of the United States ...
contain[s] provisions for the protection of individual rights, including the right of free speech,
and nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other
action by the United States which would restrict the right of free speech protected by the
Constitution laws, and practice of the United States").
214. See Rights: American and Human, supra note 198, at 423-24; Henkin, supra note 212,
at 22.
215. See Weissbrodt, supra note 198, at 62-63.
216. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 201, art. 4.
217. Economic,Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 101, art. 5.
218. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 20.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
220. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 201, art. 4.
221. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 20.
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tion to the provision."'
C. The Jurisdiction of the States and the Federal Government
22 3
The federal-state reservation is perhaps anachronistic given the
current state of United States constitutional law.224 Its purpose, how-
ever, is to facilitate the advice and consent of the Senate in the ratifi-
cation process. 225  From the viewpoint of international law it is a
typical reservation, with which the United States limits the impact of
the treaties by pledging to take appropriate measures to obtain, from
the local governments, the fulfillment of the treaties. Such a reserva-
tion would justify the failure of the United States to comply with the
treaties to the extent that their subject matter conflicts with the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the states. The United States would be respon-
sible for a breach of the treaties' provisions in only two instances: (1)
where there is concurrent jurisdiction of federal and local govern-
ments, or (2) when there is exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government.
D. Private Property Rights
226
Both Covenants have provisions referring to the "inherent right
of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth
and resources. ' 227 They manifestly recall the notion of "permanent
sovereignty over natural resources" embodied in Resolution 1803,
which declares Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
228
Resolution 3201 which declares the Establishment of a New Interna-
222. 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 112-16.
223. Message, supra note 205, at 92, 96, 102. "The United States shall implement all the
provisions of the Convention over whose subject matter the Federal Government exercises
legislative and judicial administration; with respect to those provisions over whose subject
matter constituent units exercise jurisdiction, the Federal Government shall take appropriate
measures, to the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units may take
appropriate measures for the fulfillment of this Covenant."
224. Cf Henkin, supra note 198, at 143-48, 227-48; Henkin, supra note 212, at 24-25;
Weissbrodt, supra note 198, at 63-66.
225. Cf Rovine & Goldklang, supra note 212, at 59-62.
226. Message, supra note 205, at 94, 102. The declaration provides: "The United States
declares that nothing in the Covenant derogates from the equal obligation of all States to fulfill
their responsibilities under international law. The United States understands that under the
Covenant everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others,
and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
227. Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra note 101, art. 25; Civil and Political
Covenant, supra note 101, art. 47.
228. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5127 (1962).
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tional Economic Order,229 and Resolution 3281 which contains the
Character of Economic Rights and Duties of States.230
The United States has opposed such principles because of their
direct relation to the problem of seizure or nationalization of foreign
property. Therefore, the proposed declaration on private property
rights, although not a true reservation, is a policy statement which
reaffirms the position of the United States on the subject matter. It is
perhaps a superfluous statement to be made in connection with a
human rights treaty. However, given the disputed dynamics of the
formation of customary international law it is not unwise for a State
to make such statements whenever its position is challenged.23' In
addition, it is probably essential to include such a declaration in or-
der to overcome the reluctance of the Senate towards these
232treaties.
E. Progressive Implementation
The understanding on progressive implementation is a true res-
ervation. It purports to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of both Covenants by making their application gradual.233 It is a
very common reservation in human rights treaties and is usually
made by less developed countries.234
229. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/ 9559
(1974).
230. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 50, U.N. Doc. A./ 9030 (1974).
See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 540-45; D. CARREAU, P. JUILLARD & T. FLORY,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE 84-93, 538-95 (2d ed. 1980); NGUYKEN Quoc DINH,
P. DAILLIER & A. PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 762-76 (2d ed. 1980); P. PICONE
& G. SACERDOTI, DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE DELL ECONOMIA 127-72, 245-64 (1982);
THIERRY, COMBACAU, SUR & VALLfE, supra note 7, at 614-16. All of these works have bibli-
ographical references to the abundant literature on the subject matter.
231. The hint here is to the very controversial issue-strictly linked to the general issue of
the nature of customary international law-of the "permanent (or persistent) objector." See
generally BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 10-11; THIERRY, COMBACAU, SUR & VALLtE, supra
note 7, at 111-12; TUNKIN, supra note 50, at 122-33.
232. Cf Hearings, supra note 210, at 7-10, 13-16. No other State has formulated declara-
tions with respect to the quoted provision, perhaps substantiating, on the one hand, the impres-
sion that such statements are redundant in the context of a human rights treaty, and on the
other hand, the argument that few States, if any, share the same conservative position of the
United States on this issue.
233. Message, supra note 205, at 98 ("The United States understands ... that the provi-
sions . . . of this Covenant describe goals to be achieved progressively rather than through
immediate implementation.").
234. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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F. Capital Punishment
The target of the reservation on capital punishment235 is Article
6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.236 Article 6 provides
that:
[S]entence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the com-
mission of the crime . . . Anyone sentenced to death shall have
the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence ....
Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on
pregnant women.237
In the words of Professor Weissbrodt, with the adoption of the
recommended reservation, the United States would "assert its right
to execute children and pregnant women [and to] refuse to guarantee
the availability of pardon or prevent the imposition of capital punish-
ment for non-serious crimes., 238 Such a reservation is quite useless
because it would have almost no effect on the practices of the United
States.239 Moreover, the fact that no other State has made reserva-
tions to this provision negatively emphasizes the United States' posi-
tion on the subject matter.2 °
G. Compensation and Revoked Penalties
The reservation on the right to compensation and revoked pen-
alties is made in a single statement directed toward two provisions of
the Civil and Political Covenant.24' It can therefore be regarded as
actually encompassing two reservations. 242 The first reservation
would avoid the application of Article 9(5), which bestowes an en-
forceable right to compensation to anyone who has been the victim of
unlawful arrest or detention. 243 Three other States have made reser-
vations with reference to this provision without drawing any
235. Message, supra note 205, at 98 ("The United States reserves the right to impose capi-
tal punishment on any person duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the im-
position of capital punishment.").
236. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 6.
237. Id. art. 6, paras. 2, 4, 5.
238. Weissbrodt, supra note 198, at 73-74.
239. Id. at 72 n.210.
240. See 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 121-28.
241. Message, supra note 205, at 99. The reservation provides that: "The United States
does not adhere to paragraph (5) of Article 9 or to the third clause of paragraph (1) of Article
15."
242. Cf. Weissbrodt, supra note 198, at 74-75.
243. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, at art. 9(5).
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objection. 2
The second reservation would prevent the application of the
third clause of Article 15(1). Article 15(1) provides that an offender
must benefit from new legislation enacted after the commission of the
offense if it imposes a lighter penalty.245 So far, three reservations
(by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Syria) have been
made to Article 15(1). These reservations were not objected to.
246
H. Free Legal Assistance and Double Jeopardy
The recommended statement on free legal assistance and double
jeopardy would alter the application of several norms contained in
Article 14 of the Civil and Political Covenant to make them consis-
tent with the United States law.247 First, it would modify the norms
concerning the rights to free counsel in certain instances. Moreover,
it would exclude the application of the double jeopardy clause of the
Covenant when both federal and state courts have jurisdiction in
cases involving actions which are both federal and state crimes.248 In
spite of being termed an understanding, the statement contains true
reservations. These would probably not be objected to since quite a
few nations have made reservations to Article 14.249 Seven States
have made reservations to the double jeopardy clause for varying rea-
sons. Most have made their reservations because of domestic laws
which permit resumption of criminal cases where the accused parties
were acquitted. In adddition, sixteen States have made reservations
to other norms of Article 14. These reservations range from the right
to a double exercise of jurisdiction to the right of the free assistance
of an interpreter. No State has objected to any reservation made
with respect to Article 14.
244. See 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 121-29, 132-33.
245. Civil and Political Covenant supra note 101, art. 15(1).
246. See 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 121-29, 132-33.
247. Message, supra note 205, at 100: This understanding provides that:
The United States understands that subparagraph (3)(b) and (d) of Article 14 do not
require the provision of court-appointed counsel when the defendant is financially
able to retain counsel or for petty offenses for which imprisonment will not be im-
posed. The United States further understands that paragraph (3)(e) does not forbid
requiring an indigent defendant to make a showing that the witness is necessary for
his attendance to be compelled by the court. The United States considers that provi-
sions of United States law currently in force constitute compliance with paragraph
(6). The United States understands that the prohibition on double jeopardy contained
in paragraph (7) is applicable only when the judgment of acquittal has been rendered
by a court of the same governmental unit, whether the Federal Government or a
constituent unit, which is seeking a new trial for the same cause.
248. Cf. Weissbrodt, supra note 198, at 75-77.
249. See 1982 U.N. Treaties, supra note 96, at 121-29.
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. Private Racial Discrimination
The statement on private racial discrimination25 ° is probably
best considered as a true reservation since it would exclude the appli-
cation of some provisions of the Convention on Racial Discrimina-
tion. Specifically, it would exclude application of the Convention to
private activities which are not required by federal or state laws to be
available on a non-discriminatory basis. This reservation is related to
the one concerning freedom of speech. Thus, the considerations
made with respect to that reservation may be deemed to be appropri-
ate here as well.25'
J. Summary of the Reservations Proposed by the Carter
Administration
The reservations recommended by the Carter Administration to
the Senate are not particularly troublesome from an international law
perspective. Many are analogous to reservations already made by
other States. Moreover, none of the reservations can be easily con-
sidered incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaties. In
any event, the issue of compatibility would arise only if objections
were made by the other parties to the treaties. As shown by the anal-
ysis of the Vienna Convention regime, the compatibility rule is only
applied in relationships with objecting States. Thus, if the proposed
United States reservations drew no objections within one year they
would automatically be regarded as binding on all the contracting
parties. If some objections were formulated-which today is quite
unusual in human rights treaties 252-the chance of actual legal dis-
putes appears remote. A certain number of objections, however,
might amount to a political failure. In any event, ratification with
reservations would appear to be more desirable than nonratification
for a number of legal and political reasons.253
Since 1978 the situation has not changed. The mentioned
human rights treaties and the Convention on Genocide still wait to
250. Message, supra note 205, at 90. The statement provides:
The United States understands its obligation to exact legislation and take other meas-
ures under paragraph (1) of Article 2, subparagraphs (1)(c) and (l)(d) of Article 2,
Article 3, and Article 5 to extend only to governmental or government-assisted pri-
vate activities and to private activities required to be available on a non-discrimina-
tory basis as defined by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 213-222.
252. See Appendix.
253. See Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION,
supra note 198, at 47-53; Rovine & Goldklang, supra note 212; Skelton, supra note 198,passim.
But see Henkin, supra note 212, at 25.
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be ratified. The latter treaty has already waited thirty-five years.
Thus far, the Reagan Administration has not attempted to obtain
Senate advice and consent for ratification of these treaties. However,
the Reagan Administration is reportedly now considering taking a
position in favor of ratification.254 If this occurs, the outlined reser-
vations will probably remain unaltered, and will be recommended
once again to the Senate, as will several new reservations concerning
the Convention on Genocide. 2 "
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It must be recognized that in the modem law of treaties reserva-
tions still play an important role in shaping international obligations.
Reservations to treaties on human rights do not differ from reserva-
tions made with respect to other multilateral treaties; 256 the legal re-
gime and roles are the same. The practices of States show that
reservations to human rights treaties are often made to overcome do-
mestic, legal or political problems. Such problems are frequently
overrated and often do not actually require the use of a reservation
since they have little to do with the actual compliance by the reserv-
ing States to basic human rights principles. Indeed, reservations are
useful because they allow a more universal participation to such con-
ventions. Thus, the issue of international enforcement of human
rights has little to do with the issue of reservations to human rights
treaties. The fact that States without satisfactory human rights
records often ratify without reservations is quite significant in this
regard.
In choosing whether to formulate reservations a State is bound
first by the treaty itself and secondly by the Vienna Convention re-
gime on reservations. The Vienna Convention is binding either as a
treaty or, arguably, as customary international law. The Vienna
Convention provisions, however, appear to leave wide latitude to
States in terms of control over the contents of other States' reserva-
tions. Although the rule of compatibility with the object and purpose
of the treaty-the so-called compatibility rule-is, as a matter of law,
an objective test, its legal actionability depends upon the other States'
254. See AMERICAS WATCH, HELSINKI WATCH & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, FAILURE: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POL-
ICY IN 1983, 13-14 (1984).
255. Id.
256. Contra Imbert, supra note 81, at 46: "[R]eservations to human rights conventions
undoubtedly differ from those made in respect of other conventions .... "
47
Coccia: Reservations to Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INrERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
reactions. This must not be taken to mean that States themselves
judge the validity of reservations made by other States. Such an in-
terpretation would amount to defining the compatibility rule as a
subjective acceptability test. This definition cannot be accepted be-
cause it completely nullifies Article 19 of the Vienna Convention. In
addition, it involves the pure fiction of pretending that a given State's
only concern in reacting to a reservation is its compatibility with the
object and purpose of the treaty.
The actionability of the compatibility rule, however, does de-
pend to some extent upon the other States' reaction to the reserva-
tion. The necessary premise is that a State which formulates an
incompatible reservation is undoubtedly breaching the compatibility
rule and thereby commits a wrongful act which entails its interna-
tional responsibility. If the other States accept such a reservation
(even acknowledging that it is an illegal reservation) they express
their consent and preclude the wrongfulness of such an act in relation
to themselves. The only limit to the expression of such consent falls
under the doctrine of jus cogens. If the reservation is inconsistent
with a norm ofjus cogens, consent cannot validly be given since both
States would be violating international law. Where no jus cogens is
violated, however, States can bilaterally agree on certain modifica-
tions or exclusions because reservations are in the nature of special
agreements between the reserving and the accepting States. 57
If States do object to a reservation which is incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty they do not give their consent to
the wrongful act. In such instances the objecting States are not
claiming the incompatibility of the reservation; they are simply
preventing its "legalization" in their respective bilateral relations
with the reserving State. The practical effectiveness of the compati-
bility rule is related to the use made of objections by States. The rule
cannot operate between States who have agreed, through a non-ob-
jected reservation, on a certain pattern of treaty obligations.
It has been shown that in the context of human rights treaties
objections to reservations have gradually become disfavored.258 This
appears to be due to the impairment of the role of objections brought
about by the Vienna Convention. The inversion of the presumption
257. As an evident corollary, once a reservation is made and accepted, a State cannot alter
it adding further restrictions (e.g. modifying or excluding the application of the treaty to cer-
tain geographical areas which were not mentioned in the original reservation) without violating
the basic norm pacta sunt servanda with regard to the agreement it has reached with the ac-
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concerning the entry into force of the treaty as between the reserving
and the objecting State has had a major impact on human rights trea-
ties. This has occurred because the concept of reciprocity, upon
which the notion of objection is based, has a limited influence in these
types of treaties. As a result, the compatibility rule is no longer effec-
tive in human rights treaties either. From a legal viewpoint, how-
ever, it still retains its full value. Thus, a State cannot thoughtlessly
formulate incompatible (that is illegal) reservations as this would
mean reliance on the absence of the other States' objections. Conse-
quently, this would include the risk of involvement in a legal claim
concerning the State's international responsibility. As such, the de-
bate in the United States concerning the ratification of major human
rights treaties, with or without reservations, must take the compati-
bility rule into some account.
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APPENDIX
STATES' ATTITUDES TOWARD RESERVATIONS AND OB-




Open. Entry No. of No. of No. of Whose
Treaty for into States States States Reserv.
Sign. Force Parties Making Object. to Are
Reserv. Reserv. Object. to
Dec. Jan.
Genocide' 1948 1951 89 22 11 22
Traffic in Mar. July
Persons 2  1950 1951 52 14 3 4
Women Mar. July
Pol.Rts. 3  1953 1954 90 42 12 14
Racial Mar. Jan.
Discrim. 1966 1969 117 44 2 8
Econ.Soc. Dec. Jan.
Cul.Rts.5  1966 1976 75 30 3 1
Civ.Pol. Dec. Mar.
Rts.6  1966 1976 75 35 3 3
* Some specifications: a. Data are drawn from U.N., Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary-General, Dec. 31, 1982, ST/LEG.SER.E/2, at 91-145; b. "Reservations" is
to be understood in the broadest sense, comprehensive of declarations and understandings,
given the extreme subjectivity inherent in ascertaining the real essence of a government's state-
ments; c. Not included in the Table: i) treaties which forbid reservations, ii) regional treaties,
iii) minor treaties, iv) treaties concerning side issues, e.g., refugees or stateless persons,
v) treaties amending pre-UN treaties, vi) treaties concluded under the auspices of specialized
agencies.
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
2. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostituion of Others, July 25, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
3. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, July 7, 1954, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
4. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [this was adopted in Resolution form by the UN General
Assembly on Dec. 21, 1965, in G.A. Res. 2106, 20 GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965)].
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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APPENDIX
STATES' ATTITUDES TOWARD RESERVATIONS AND OB-




Open. Entry No. of No. of No. of Whose
Treaty for into States States States Reserv.
Sign. Force Parties Making Object. to Are









1966 1976 28 6 0 0
Nov. Nov.
1968 1970 23 13 0 0
Nov. July
1973 1976 70 6 1 2
Women Dec. Sept.
Discrim. l °  1979 1981 45 27 0 0
7. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59. U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966).
8. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
9. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
10. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
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